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The Local Government Boundary Problem
in Metropolitan Areas
Richard Briffault*
Local government boundaries play an important role in the governance of
metropolitan areas by defining local electorates and tax bases and the scope of
local regulatory powers and service responsibilities. Yet, the close association
of local powers with local boundaries generates spillovers, fiscal disparities,
and interlocal conflicts. Real local autonomy is constrained but the local gov-
ernment system fails to provide a means for addressing regional problems.
Public choice theorists and political decentralizationists oppose regional gov-
ernments because of the threat to local autonomy that would result from re-
moving powers from local hands. Richard Briffault's solution to the
metropolitan governance problem is a "mixed strategy" that would both re-
duce the significance of existing local boundaries and create elected regionally
bounded governments to address matters of regional significance. In his re-
gime, small local governments would remain units for local decisionmaking.
But regional political institutions, with regional land use and fiscal powers,
would provide an opportunity for regionwide deliberation, popular participa-
tion in decisions of regional significance, and the framing and implementation
of policies addressed to the needs of the region as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE METROPOLITAN AREA GOVERNANCE PROBLEM
The governance of metropolitan areas is the central problem for local gov-
ernment law today. Local government law has traditionally been associated
with the organization and powers of discrete localities. Such localities, typi-
cally, are relatively small in both population and area, with densely populated
cores bounded by lightly populated fringes that set them off from other, similar
localities. Residents of particular discrete localities have relatively high levels
of interaction with each other and much less intense interactions with residents
of other localities. Local government law enables the people who live within
these discrete areas to organize themselves into distinct political units and gives
those units power to make decisions with respect to a range of public policies
and services. Although the extent of power granted to localities varies consid-
erably from state to state-and often from locality to locality within a particu-
lar state-the essence of local autonomy is the ability of people within distinct
small areas to decide for themselves by democratic means the matters that fall
within the competence of local authority.
* Professor of Law & Director of Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia Law School.
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As the twentieth century draws to a close, however, most Americans live
not in discrete, compact localities, but rather in sprawling metropolitan areas.
In 1990, 193 million people, or 78 percent of the total population of the United
States, lived in metropolitan areas, as defined by the Census Bureau.' The
twenty-one most populous metropolitan areas (those with two million people or
more) included 101 million people, or 40 percent of the population.2 Slightly
more than half of all Americans lived in the thirty-nine major metropolitan
areas that contain one million people or more.
3
Major metropolitan areas are far larger in population and territory than the
localities that have traditionally been the subject of local government law. The
San Francisco Bay Area contains six million people-a population greater than
that of forty states-and seven thousand square miles-almost the size of Mas-
sachusetts. 4 Metropolitan Houston consists of 3.7 million people spread over
an even more capacious 7151 square miles.5 Nearly 2.6 million people live in
the almost six thousand square miles that make up greater Seattle.
6
Metropolitanization has also transformed the localities within metropolitan
areas. The defining features of traditional localities-intensity of interaction
within the locality and separation of that locality from others-are increasingly
absent in the metropolitan setting. Metropolitan area residents do not concen-
trate their activities within their home locality, nor do metropolitan area busi-
nesses typically draw most of their workers or customers from their home
localities. Metropolitan localities frequently lack internal focal points, such as
a downtown, village commons, park, community facility, or other place for
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA
BOOK 1991, at 205 (1991). According to the Census Bureau:
The general concept of a metropolitan area (MA) is that of a geographic area consisting of a
large population nucleus together with adjacent communities which have a high degree of
economic and social integration with that nucleus....
.. [A]n area qualifies for recognition as an MA in one of two ways: (1) if it includes a
city of at least 50,000 or more inhabitants, or (2) if it includes a Census-Bureau defined urban-
ized area of at least 50,000 inhabitants with a total MA population of at [least] 100,000
(75,000 in New England). In addition to the county containing the main city or urbanized
area, an MA may include additional outlying counties that meet specified requirements of
commuting to work and of metropolitan character (such as population density and percent
urban). A metropolitan area may contain more than one city of 50,000 population and may
cross State lines.
Id. at 353.
2. Eli Ginzberg, The Changing Urban Scene: 1960-1990 and Beyond, in INTERwovEN DESINIES:
CITIEs AND THE NATION 33, 35 (Henry G. Cisneros ed., 1993) [hereinafter DESTINIES].
3. NEAL R. PEIRCE, CmsTATEs: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPErITIVE WoRLD 4
(1993).
4. Victor Jones & Donald N. Rothblatt, Governance of the San Francisco Bay Area, in MErRO-
POLITAN GOVERNANCE: AMERiCAN/CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 375, 377 (Donald N.
Rothblatt & Andrew Sancton eds., 1993) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE].
5. Robert D. Thomas, Urban Growth Decision Making in the Houston Area, in METROpoLITAN
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 283, 285.
6. PEIRE, supra note 3, at 81. Contemporary metropolitan regions are far larger than the metro-
politan cities of the start of this century. As Robert Fishman points out: "Where the leading metropo-
lises of the early 20th century-New York, London, or Berlin-covered perhaps 100 square miles, the
new city [or the metropolitan region] routinely encompasses two to three thousand square miles. Within
such 'urban regions,' each element is correspondingly enlarged." Robert Fishman, Megalopolis Un-
bound, WILSON Q., Winter 1990, at 25, 28.
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casual socializing.7 Such localities remain the physical settings for residences,
enterprises, and other organizations within their borders, but they are certainly
not "communities" in the traditional warm and fuzzy sense of the term. 8
How are metropolitan areas to be governed? Not one major metropolitan
area is governed by a single all-encompassing general purpose local govern-
ment.9 Some metropolitan areas have special-purpose regional governmental
entities. These bodies, however, are sometimes limited in territorial scope to
just a portion of the metropolitan area. They are typically governed by ap-
pointed rather than elected officials. Most importantly, they nearly always lack
the plenary taxing, regulatory, and service-delivery authority characteristic of
general purpose municipal governments.
The dearth of metropolitan area governments is not for lack of ideas, advo-
cates, or struggles to create them. Since the late nineteenth century good gov-
ernment groups, political scientists, and central city business and political
leaders have urged the creation of general-purpose governments with bounda-
ries coextensive with metropolitan areas. 10 Such governments could be pro-
duced through annexations by the largest city in the region or by the
consolidation of the existing local governments and unincorporated land into
one large unit. Occasionally, as with the 1898 consolidation of the cities, coun-
ties, and towns on the New York State side of New York Harbor into Greater
New York, these efforts were crowned with success' II-although even in New
York success was ultimately undone by the expansion of the metropolitan area
beyond the boundaries of the consolidated city. More commonly, from Bos-
7. PEIRcE, supra note 3, at 306; Fishman, supra note 6, at 38.
8. On the loss of community in metropolitan areas, see KENNrETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRAss FRON-
TIER: THE SUBURBANIZATrON OF THE UNITED STATES 272-82 (1985).
Raymond Williams notes that although "community" has many definitions, the term "seems never
to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term." RAY-
ioND WILiAms, KEYwoRDs: A VOCABUIARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 66 (rev. ed. 1983). Albert
Hunter points out that social scientists tend to view, "community as an unqualified good. The positive
connotations of friendliness, warmth, and support are seldom countered with the accompanying charac-
teristics of constraint and conformity, and the loss of privacy, individualism, and freedom." Albert
Hunter, Persistence of Local Sentiments in Mass Society, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN
LIFE: AN EXAINATION OF URBANIZATION, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, AND METROPOLITAN POLITICS 133,
134-35 (David Street & Assocs. eds., 1978).
9. David Rusk points out that there are 48 metropolitan areas in which 60% or more of the popula-
tion falls within the jurisdiction of a single general purpose government. In 32 of those areas, the so-
called metropolitan government has jurisdiction over less than 75% of the area's population. Another 15
areas have governments that cover at least 75% but less than all of the metropolitan area population.
These tend to be areas with relatively small populations-their average population is about 150,000.
Only one metropolitan area (with a population of about 226,000) has a government with jurisdiction
over the entire area. DAVID RUSK, CrrIEs WITHOUT SUBURBS 89, 95-96 (1993).
10. See e.g., VICTOR JoNEs, METROPOLITAN GovERNrmENr 85-154 (1942) (summarizing proposals
for integrating the local government of metropolitan areas); PAUL STUDENSKt, NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE,
THE GovEamtENr OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES 41-42 (1930) (discussing various
methods of metropolitan integration); Chester C. Maxey, The Political Integration of Metropolitan Com-
munities, 11 NAT'L MUN. REV. 229, 230-51 (1922) (summarizing early efforts at political unification of
metropolitan areas),
11. Expansion of the metropolitan area beyond the consolidated city ultimately undid this victory.
See generally, Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Seces-
sion of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
775 (1992) (describing the consolidation of greater New York).
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ton12 to San Francisco, 13 metropolitan government campaigns ended in fail-
ure-either shot down by voters when submitted to referendum or blocked by
local opposition from even getting before the electorate at all. Most urbanists
would probably agree that centralized metropolitan government is today "not
politically viable."'
14
As political opposition repeatedly doomed proposals for centralized metro-
politan governments, reformers developed ideas for "two-tier" or "federative"
plans that would move only some municipal functions to a metropolitan level
government, while leaving the rest to local governments.' 5 These plans in-
volved superimposing new regional structures over existing local governments,
or, in metropolitan areas consisting of one county, taking advantage of the ex-
isting structure by shifting powers and responsibilities traditionally wielded by
municipalities to the county.
Two-tier plans and federative schemes have dominated the metropolitan
government reform agenda since the 1950s.16 Several major areas adopted
two-tiered systems in the 1950s and 1960s, including Miami-Dade County,
Nashville-Davidson County, Jacksonville-Duval County, and Indianapolis-
Marion County. 17 Other areas, including metropolitan Seattle,' 8 greater Port-
12. See Mark I. Gelfand, Development Policy in Metropolitan Boston, in METROPOLITAN GovRnN-
ANCE, supra note 4, at 13, 23-29 (attributing the rejection of "[t]hree different plans for reorganizing
local and regional government [to a] combination of seventeenth century Puritan theology, eighteenth
century Republican political theory, and nineteenth and twentieth century sociology").
13. Kenneth A. Brunetti, Note, It's Time to Create a Bay Area Regional Government, 42 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1103, 1108-16 (1991) (discussing past efforts at creating regional governments).
14. Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan Areas: Cities, Suburbs, and the Ties that Bind, in DESTINIES,
supra note 2, at 147, 164; see also ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 170
(1994) ("Metropolitan government has almost no political support.").
15. See, e.g., CoMMi-rE - FOR ECON. DEV., RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
44-46 (1970) (recommending a two-level system of government consisting of an areawide government
and a local government).
16. For a recent call for "some form of regional planning and decision-making structure," see
PEIRCE, supra note 3, at 316-22. Contemporary advocacy of metropolitan government is not entirely
limited to calls for the two-tier variation. David Rusk argues that "a true metro government must be a
general purpose local government. It must have all of the powers of a municipality under applicable
state law." RusK, supra note 9, at 89. Rusk would centralize metropolitan governments by, inter alia,
empowering urban counties, abolishing municipal governments, consolidating cities and counties into
central regional governments, and facilitating annexation by central cities. Id. at 91-119.
17. JOHN J. HARRIGAN, POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOuS 313-20 (4th ed. 1989); Allan D.
Wallis, Inventing Regionalism: The First Two Waves, 83 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 159, 163 (1994). For a brief
criticism of Miami-Dade County, see John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas:
Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REv. 449, 465-66 (1993). For more favorable
evaluations of the Indianapolis-Marion County, Nashville-Davidson County, and Jacksonville-Duval
County experiments, see RusK, supra note 9, at 93-94; H. V. Savitch, Daniel Sanders & David Collins,
The Regional City and Public Partnerships, in IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SUMMrr
WITH RELATED ANALYSES, TRANSCRI'r, AND PAPERS 65, 70-72 (Ronald Berkman, Joyce F. Brown,
Beverly Goldberg & Tod Mijanovich eds., 1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL INTEREST].
18. In 1957, concerned about pollution of Lake Washington on the eastern edge of Seattle, the
state of Washington authorized the creation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle ("Metro") and
vested it with the power to administer sewer and garbage services, transportation, planning, parks, and
water supply in the greater Seattle area, subject to the approval of the voters. Area voters initially
limited Metro's authority to sewage services, Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. City of Seattle, 357 P.2d
863, 866 (Wash. 1960). In 1971, Metro's boundaries were enlarged to coincide with those of King
County, the county in which Seattle is located. In 1972, after two earlier rejections, voters approved
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land,' 9 and the Twin Cities region,20 continue to experiment with regional
structures authorized to set some aspects of metropolitan area policy without
wielding the full powers of a general purpose local government.
On balance, the push for two-tier governments has not been much more
successful than the earlier campaign for centralized metropolitan govern-
ments.2' Many metropolitan areas created, or accepted state creation of, re-
gional entities empowered to provide physical infrastructure services, such as
waste disposal or mass transit, or to operate amenities that serve a regionwide
constituency, such as a park or a zoo. But there are very few metropolitan
areas in which regional entities are authorized to engage in the kind of policy
making, regulation, and revenue raising characteristically entrusted to munici-
Metro's takeover of public transit responsibilities. Metro was both a planning and an operating agency,
financed by a combination of fees, taxes, grants, and bonds.
In 1990, a federal district court held that Metro's governance structure, in which elected officials of
Metro's component municipalities served either ex officio or by appointment of other elected officials,
violated the one-person, one-vote requirement. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F.
Supp. 885, 895 (W.D. Wash. 1990). In 1992, voters approved the merger of Metro with King County,
effective 1994. In 1993, King and adjacent Pierce and Snohomish counties agreed to form a regional
transit authority. 35-Year-Old Government Did Much More than Clean Lake Washington, SEATrLE
TMEs, Dec. 17, 1993, at BIO.
19. Approved by voters in the three counties of the greater Portland area in 1970, the Portland
Metropolitan Service District ("MSD") focused initially on solid waste disposal and administering the
Portland Zoo. In 1978, the MSD was strengthened and given substantial regional planning responsibili-
ties. Its enabling legislation also authorized the MSD to run the regional transportation agency and to
assume responsibility for a range of functions, subject to voter approval. The district now manages the
performing arts and convention centers and recently took over one county's parks.
Unusual among multiservice regional agencies, the MSD has had, since 1978, an elected governing
board. In 1992, area voters further strengthened the MSD by approving a "home rule" charter for the
district, confirming its role in regulating the urban growth boundary that determines sites for future land
development in the region, and authorizing it to levy up to $12.5 million in sales taxes. See Gordon
Oliver, Metro: A Governmental Ghost Gathers Substance, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 20, 1994, at Cl,
C4.
20. Minnesota created the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in 1967 to address a water pollution
crisis. The state authorized the Council to coordinate long-term plans for the metropolitan area, to
recommend policies to local governments, and to review proposed projects or activities that have metro-
politan significance. But even though it reviewed the budgets of the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the
Metropolitan Waste Control, the Metropolitan Airports Commission, and other single purpose regional
agencies, the Council had very little operating authority. See Judith Martin, In Fits and Starts: The
Twin Cities Metropolitan Framework in METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE, supra note 4. at 205, 214-15. In
1994, the Minnesota legislature voted to merge the regional waste control and transit authorities into the
Council, but rejected a proposal to make the Council an elective body. Dane Smith, Legislators Push to
Wrap Up Key Bills: Metro Government Measure: Transit Service Turned Over to Met Council, STAR
TRrB., May 6. 1994, at lB.
The Council is also authorized to administer Minnesota's Fiscal Disparities Act, which provides for
depositing a portion of the growth in tax base resulting from commercial and industrial development
into a regional pool and distributing the increased revenues among the localities in the Twin Cities area
according to their fiscal capacity. See Martin, supra at 228.
21. See, e.g., Frank Bowers & Kathy A. Bolten, Commonwealth Plan Voted Down in Polk:
"Grassroots Politics" Outguns the Financial Backing of Charter's Supporters, DEs MOINEs REG., Nov.
9, 1994, at I (discussing voters' rejection of a plan to strengthen the Polk County, Iowa government at
the expense of its constituent cities); Gary Craig, Regionalizing Rochester, EMPiRE ST. REP., Aug. 1995,
at 40, 42 (detailing defeat of efforts to create a countywide police force and public opposition to the
creation of a countywide school district in Monroe County (Rochester) New York). For details of the
Polk County plan, see Polk County Bd. of Supervisors v. Polk Commonwealth Charter Comm'n, 522
N.W.2d 783, 786-95 (Iowa 1994).
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palities-the general purpose local governments principally responsible for the
provision of local services in metropolitan areas.
Although there are few local governments of metropolitan scope, the major
metropolitan areas are hardly without local governments. In 1987, the typical
metropolitan area had 113 local governments, including forty-seven general
purpose governments, such as a county or a municipality. 22 The profusion of
governments is even greater in larger metropolitan areas. There are over 1250
local governments in the Chicago area, including six counties and 261 munici-
palities;23 nearly 300 local governments in the Pittsburgh area, including more
than 100 municipalities; 24 more than 300 governments in greater Seattle, in-
cluding three counties and sixty-five cities and towns;2 and approximately 350
governments, including 168 cities and towns, in metropolitan Baltimore.
2 6
Even in the Sunbelt, which tends to have fewer localities per metropolitan area,
greater Phoenix has 138 governments, including twenty-one municipalities, 27
while Hampton Roads, Virginia, the nation's twenty-seventh largest metropoli-
tan area, has at least seventy-five units of government.28
The lack of an overarching government for a metropolitan area, and the
existence instead of a multiplicity of small, abutting, and sometimes overlap-
ping local governments is not necessarily a problem. Indeed, the public choice
school celebrates this governance structure, claiming it creates a metropolitan
"market place" that expands the range of public policy choices available to
residents, increases their satisfaction with local government services and deci-
sions, and improves the responsiveness of local government to citizen prefer-
ences.29 Public choice scholars oppose the creation of general purpose regional
governments. They contend that the public benefits from the current mix of
interlocal competition and voluntary interlocal agreements, supplemented by
special purpose regional bodies to take advantage of regional economies of
scale in provision of capital-intensive physical infrastructure, are significant.
Exponents of decentralized politics, like law professors Richard Thompson
Ford and Jerry Frug, are more critical of the metropolitan governance status
22. Donald N. Rothblatt, Summary and Conclusions, in METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE, supra note
4, at 433, 452.
23. George C. Hemmens & Janet McBride, Planning and Development Decision Making in the
Chicago Region, in METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 111, 117.
24. PEIRCE, supra note 3, at 34.
25. Id. at 81.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id. at 39.
28. Id. at 33.
29. See ROBERT L. BISH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 2 (Julius Margolis &
Aaron Wildavsky eds., 1971) (defending multiple government structure as economically viable and
healthy); Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Metropolitan Organization and Governance: A Local
Public Economy Approach, 25 URB. AFtI. Q. 18, 20 (1989) ("[M]ore fragmented metropolitan areas tend
to be more efficient."); cf. Richard E. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition, Monopoly, and the
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J.L. & ECON. 661, 684 (1975) (fragmented
governments are more desirable if it is "preferable to have governments act more like competitive sup-
pliers of public output than like monopolistic suppliers"); Robert Warren, A Municipal Services Market
Model of Metropolitan Organization, 30 J. AM. INsT. PLANNERS 193, 199-201 (1964) ("Mhe viability
of decentralized governmental systems has been greatly underestimated."). See generally VINCENT Os-
TROM, ROBERT BISH & ELINOR OSTROM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
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quo, but they also oppose strong metropolitan area regional governments. Pro-
fessor Ford would reduce the "parochialism and insularity" that current ar-
rangements have produced, but he rules out establishing a "centralized regional
authority" that might threaten local participatory politics or community auton-
omy.30 Professor Frug suggests creating regional legislatures but urges that
any such legislature "be structured to encourage its members not to exercise
power themselves but to turn the legislature into a forum for inter-local negotia-
tions about how to decentralize power."'31 Professors Ford and Frug both pro-
pose legal rules making local boundaries more "permeable"; in particular, they
discuss extending the franchise in municipal elections to voters who live be-
yond the locality's borders. This, they contend, would improve metropolitan
area governance without creating undesirable regional institutions or shifting
local power to higher levels of government.
32
This article examines metropolitan governance through the prism of local
government boundaries. Part II considers the role of boundaries in the theory
and law of local government. Boundaries are crucial to the interwoven set of
political and economic arguments for local autonomy by helping to make local
governments appropriate settings for political participation, for organizing the
efficient provision of public goods and services, and for community self-gov-
ernment. Boundaries also affect both the principal powers and duties of local
governments and the relationship between local governments and their people.
Yet, boundaries can also be the Achilles' heel of local government law, sub-
verting local autonomy even as they support its values. The problem of local
government boundaries nicely mirrors a central dilemma of local autonomy:
the absence of any obvious metric for determining what constitutes a proper
unit for the exercise of local autonomy. Economic and social patterns and the
governance structures of contemporary metropolitan areas compound this
dilemma.
The traditional metropolitan reform strategy assumes that only a govern-
ment of regional scope can efficiently and democratically handle regional
problems. Public choice and political decentralizationists, however, argue that
by taking power out of local hands regional governments threaten the core
value of local autonomy. In Part III, I suggest that their proposals for reducing
the significance of existing local boundaries without creating new regionally-
bounded local governments cannot address contemporary metropolitan
problems effectively.
Public choice theory relies entirely on self-interested local action-either
competition or voluntary interlocal cooperation. The only change in the legal
background rules that this approach may require is an expansion of local gov-
ernments' power to contract with each other for the provision of government
30. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
H~Av. L. REv. 1841, 1908-09 (1994).
31. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CM. L. Rav. 253, 297 (1993).
32. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909-10 & n.221; Frug, supra note 31, at 324-25, 329-30.
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services. 33 But this approach leaves the decision whether to reduce the barriers
posed by local boundaries entirely up to local self-interest. Such interlocal
agreements are less likely when they require the cooperation of several locali-
ties scattered across a metropolitan region, or when the benefits are long-term
and diffuse while the costs, in terms of loss of local regulatory or fiscal auton-
omy, are immediate and concrete. As a result, interlocal agreements are un-
likely to affect local exclusionary land use practices or the current immunity of
the local tax base from the revenue needs of other localities.
Advocates of political decentralization purport to address land use regula-
tion and interlocal wealth and service disparities without taking power out of
local hands. But their proposals compromise the local-level decisionmaking
they claim to protect. Mandating interlocal negotiations concerning the scope
of local power necessarily entails shifting power up and out to a government of
more extended boundaries-whether a regional government or the state-be-
cause only such a government can limit local power to act in the absence of
interlocal agreement. Similarly, cross-border voting necessarily transfers
power from localities to the region as a whole. Moreover, by loosening ties
between a local government and its residents, cross-border voting may threaten
to undermine the collective self-government at the heart of local government
law. Decentralization proposals will likely either have no effect on current
metropolitan problems or have an impact only by covertly stripping powers
from some localities or local people.
In Part IV, I conclude by suggesting that a solution to the metropolitan
governance problem requires a mixed strategy, combining two types of bound-
ary reform: more permeable local boundaries and regionally bounded local
governments. Small local governments should remain units for local collective
decisionmaking; indeed, larger cities should create smaller units empowered to
address neighborhood-level problems. As Professors Frug and Ford contend, in
light of the intertwined relationships of local areas in metropolitan regions, we
should redefine the scope of local autonomy and revise local regulatory and
fiscal powers. But local governments are unlikely to become more sensitive to
the regional implications of their actions without regional institutions empow-
ered to enforce regional duties, to monitor local actions with regional conse-
quences, and to promote cooperation that serves the collective long-term
interests of the region.
This two-part boundary reform admittedly resembles the two-tier or federa-
tive structures that have so far largely failed the test of political viability. It
may be a paradox of metropolitan governance that structures that now exist or
are likely to be adopted will not actually work to solve regional problems, and
those with a better chance of working will not be adopted. The allure of polit-
ical decentralization remains strong in both law and politics. Creating entities
with regional boundaries and increasing the permeability of local boundaries
33. By 1990, interlocal service agreements were authorized by the state constitutions or general
laws of 42 states. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., STATE LAWS GOVERNING
LoCAL GOVERNMENT STRucruRE AND ADMINISTRATION 26-27 (1993).
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will both result in a loss of power at the local level. As a result, neither is likely
to win easy acceptance. But a broad decentralization of power to the local level
is simply not possible in the major metropolitan areas in which most Americans
live. Indeed, the current highly decentralized governance structure actually
hampers the ability of metropolitan area residents to address the many issues of
regional scope that directly affect their localities. We need to acknowledge the
failure of metropolitan decentralization strategies and to consider new regional
structures that accept some loss of formal legal autonomy but enhance the ca-
pacity of metropolitan area residents to address regional problems.
I. LOCAL AUTONOMY, LOCAL BOUNDARIES, AND METROPOLITAN AREAS
A. Local Autonomy and Local Boundaries
Advocates of local autonomy argue that it promotes democratic citizen-
ship,34 allocational efficiency in the provision of public services,35 and the col-
lective self-determination of territorial communities. 36 As I shall indicate,
boundaries are critical to the advancement of each of the values that support the
case for local autonomy.
1. Democracy.
Local governments have long been celebrated for their role as incubators of
democracy. As John Stuart Mill wrote, participation at the local level is the
"practical part of the political education of a free people."37 Alexis de To-
queville also turned to the metaphor of education in describing the role of local
government in American democracy: "Town meetings are to liberty what pri-
mary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach
men how to use and how to enjoy it." s38 Popular participation in political activ-
ity is said to equip people with the "individual attitudes and psychological qual-
ities" that make self-government possible while providing an opportunity for
"practice in democratic skills and procedures. '3 9 All other things being equal,
active political participation is more likely to take place in smaller polities than
in larger ones.
The costs of participation in terms of the time, energy, and money needed
to reach out, engage, and persuade other members of the polity are likely to be
lower in smaller units than in larger ones.40 Moreover, smaller political units
enhance the benefits of participation by increasing the likelihood that a citi-
34. For the leading modem scholarly work advancing the link between political participation and
local government, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1980).
35. For the seminal work in the economic theory of local government, see Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
36. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 85-87 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (defending a community's decision to ban nude dancing and stating that citizens should be
able to shape their community to embody their conception of decency).
37. JOHN STuART MIL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 121-22 (John Gray ed., 1991).
38. Ax ExIs DE TocQuaEVHnLY, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERicA 61 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
39. CAROLE PATMMAN, PARnCIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42 (1970).
40. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL & EDwARD R. TuFrE, SIzE AND DEMOCRACY 41-42 (1973).
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zen's "action will make a significant difference in the outcome, that is, that he
will be effective" 41 in determining policy or winning office or, at least, in being
heard. This results in an increased sense of "citizen effectiveness," 42 which, by
rewarding participation, is likely to result in further participation. 4
3
Boundaries are part of what makes it possible for localities to serve as
schools of democracy since boundaries are what make small units small.
Boundaries mark off the smaller units from the larger polities, creating "little
republics" 44 in the midst of the surrounding greater republic.
Moreover, boundaries define and delimit the political community, confining
to those within the boundaries the right to participate in its decisions. This
reduces the number of fellow citizens whom the would-be participant needs to
contact, communicate with, argue with, and ultimately persuade in the course
of local political debate. By shrinking the population denominator, boundaries
give those remaining in the numerator that greater share of power and influence
in the polity seen as crucial in increasing the propensity to participate. Bounda-
ries, in other words, are what make possible the enhanced sense of citizen-
effectiveness so essential for participation.
2. Efficiency.
The second principal argument for local autonomy is that it promotes the
efficient provision of public goods and services. This occurs in three ways.
First, local autonomy permits public policy decisions to match distinctive local
conditions and preferences. If all political decisions were taken at a highly
centralized level, it would be difficult to vary policies in light of the diverse
circumstances and preferences that might exist throughout the larger society.
Centrally determined policies may leave large numbers of people subject to
policies they oppose. Decentralization allows local bodies to tailor services,
regulation, and taxation to the needs and desires of their particular constituents.
To the extent that differences in preferences concerning public action correlate
with residence in particular localities, local autonomy can increase the ability of
government to respond to those preferences.
Second, in Charles Tiebout's model, if there are large numbers of localities
in a given area, and people are free to relocate from one locality to another,
individuals will be able to select among localities, each offering its particular
package of taxes, services, and regulation. The multiplicity of localities per-
mits a range of choices and increases the ease of movement among them, en-
hancing the likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile
"consumer-voter's" preferences. 45 People can sort themselves out by moving,
41. Id. at 41.
42. Id.
43. Although there is not much connection between size of a polity and voter turnout, id. at 44,
evidence suggests that citizens do have a "greater sense of competence and effectiveness" in smaller
units. Id. at 60.
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 13 THE WRTNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 394, 400 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903) (describing a
proposal to divide counties into "wards ... of self-government" that would act as "little republics").
45. Tiebout, supra note 35, at 417.
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with those having similar preferences for local public goods, services, and taxes
settling in the same localities and apart from people with different preferences.
Third, the existence of a large number of localities limits the monopolistic
tendencies of government. Instead of one government providing public serv-
ices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the multiplicity of local governments gives a
citizen options. The citizen may leave the locality whose tax, regulatory, or
service decisions are unresponsive to her preferences. Coupled with the polit-
ical value of small local size, which enables people to voice their policy prefer-
ences to local decisionmakers more effectively, the opportunity to exit to an
adjacent locality means that people are not constrained to accept local govern-
ment policies. The possibility of taxpayer exit and, conversely, the possibility
of drawing in new taxpayers from other localities provide incentives for local
government actions, leading them to vie with each other to retain their taxpay-
ers and attract new ones, just as firms compete for customers.
The existence of several nearby local governments enables people to gather
information concerning the comparative efficiency and quality of their own
governments: "In a more competitive and more information-rich environment,
communities can more easily monitor their bureaucrats and test the veracity of
bureaucratic claims about the costs of supplying public goods and services."
46
The combination of government fear of taxpayer exit, interlocal competition for
new taxpayers, and enhanced resident oversight of their own local governments
constrain local government deviation from the preferences of local residents.
In general, interlocal competition checks local taxing, spending, and adminis-
trative inefficiency.
Although efficiency is difficult to measure, evidence supports the public
choice claim that a multiplicity of local governments in metropolitan areas
holds down the cost of local government. In his cross-regional statistical analy-
sis of local finances, Mark Schneider found that the number of localities bor-
dering a municipality has a significant negative correlation to that
municipality's expenditures. 47 Schneider also concluded that "[i]n regions
where there is more variation in tax bills across communities, [local] expendi-
tures are lower... as variation in tax costs ... limit the expansionary demands
of bureaucrats and keep expenditures more in line with objective local need."48
Boundaries underlie much of the argument for the efficiency of the local
government system. First, boundaries demarcate the multiple local govern-
ments that constitute the metropolitan market place in municipal services,
thereby creating multiple units in which differing decisions concerning taxa-
tion, regulation, and services are reached.
Second, by making the units of taxation, service provision, and regulation
congruent with each other and with the unit in which the decisions concerning
these local policy matters are reached, boundaries make possible the internal-
46. MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CtTY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA 69 (1989).
47. Id. at 63-65.
48. Id. at 69.
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ization of the costs and benefits of local decisions essential for local actions to
be efficient.
49
Third, by providing an outer limit to the revenue-raising and regulatory
reach of a locality, boundaries make possible taxpayer exit from the locality-
just as by providing jurisdictional borders in which adjacent localities may
make policy decisions, boundaries provide a potential exiter with a destination.
3. Territorial community.
Localities are not simply arbitrary collections of small groups of people that
provide citizens with the opportunity to engage in collective deliberation or
offer random "consumer-voters" a place to shop for local public services. Lo-
cal governments are geographic units tied to specific places. Moreover, locali-
ties are frequently assumed to be communities-groups of people with shared
concerns and values, distinct from those of the surrounding world, and tied up
with the history and circumstances of the particular places in which those
groups are located and in which the people who compose them interact with
each other.
Local governments, in short, are place-based polities organized on the prin-
ciple of residency. People live in localities, raise their children there, and share
many interests related to their homes, families, and immediate neighborhoods.
Much of the power of the idea of local autonomy in our legal and political
culture grows out of just this connection of government with place-based resi-
dential association.
The significance of territorial community is not often spelled out by the
advocates of local autonomy, 50 but to a considerable extent, it is implicit in the
arguments from participation and efficiency.
Localities traditionally consist of people who interact with each other across
a range of activities-work, church, school, shopping, fraternal organization-
or run into each other casually on a regular basis simply because they live near
each other.51 As Nancy Schwartz observed in explaining the significance of
the local ward in the governance of medieval Florence, "the wards became and
remained the locus of that 'veritable trilogy' of associations-parenti, vicini e
amici-kinsmen, neighbors, and friends."1
52
Participation may be more likely to occur in just such territorial communi-
ties. From proximity and frequent interaction, people come to know each other
better, learn how to cooperate, and develop ties of mutual obligation and re-
49. See Tiebout, supra note 35, at 418-19 (arguing that local governments will be efficient provid-
ers of public services only when they "exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between
communities").
50. But see, Frug, supra note 31, at 266-67 (offering the "concept of community" as an explana-
tion of the "judicial and legislative defense of localism").
51. See, e.g., DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SovEREiGNTY: TERRITORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
aE TwEaNY-FiRsT Cm'ruRY 189-90 (1995) (describing the "old-fashioned township" as a "place of
congruence" where an individual usually held many statuses, all of which were linked with or recog-
nized by the rest of the community).
52. NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GuITAR: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY 119
(1988).
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spect. The frequent face-to-face interaction characteristic of the traditional ter-
ritorial community is said to promote "empathy and commitment to the
common good."'53 Thus territorial community may reduce the costs of partici-
pation. Furthermore, the common ties and shared interests of community mem-
bers enhance the likelihood that local decisions will produce outcomes
generally acceptable within the community. As a result, the rewards of partici-
pation invite residents to play a larger role in local government.
Similarly, the assumption that localities are territorial communities is im-
plicit in the argument that local autonomy promotes efficiency. Because of the
thick overlap of activities tied to residence, people in localities may share inter-
ests and concerns-particularly the sort of interests and concerns relevant to
local governance. Many of the most important interests and concerns that peo-
ple have relate to their homes, their neighbors, and their immediate geographic
environment. The use of territorial units for local governance increases the
likelihood that government can effectively attend to such place-based interests.
Moreover, neighbors may have more than their place-based interests in com-
mon. People may choose to settle in areas in which they believe they share a
way of life or views across a broad spectrum of issues and concerns with mem-
bers of the existing community. Neighbors may have common values or exper-
iences that contribute to a common perspective on public affairs and political
values.
In other words, the use of territorial units for the provision of public goods
and services may provide a framework for the formation and maintenance of
communities of interest concerning a variety of political questions. The poten-
tial for homogeneity that grows out of common territory reduces the "political
externality" costs to individuals displeased with government decisions.54 Terri-
toriality, thus, joins the small size and large numbers of local units in making
the case for the efficiency of decentralized government.
Beyond these more specific linkages to participation and efficiency, "com-
munity" may be a value in its own right, which local autonomy advances. In
this more romantic vision, localities are not just places where some people hap-
pen to live at a particular moment in time. Rather, the use of the term "commu-
nity" conjures up the notion of a locality as a place with a distinctive history,
identifiable characteristics, and a unique identity.5 5 Localities are "valued not
as temporary nodes in a continual migratory process, but as 'life spaces,' rich
with personal and cultural meaning."'56 The community is a form of associa-
tion, composed of and valuable to its residents, but with an existence and sig-
nificance apart from the particular people who happen to live there at a
53. JANE J. MANSBRIGE, BEYOND AoVEPsARY DEMOCRACy 275 (1980); see also ROBERT C.
WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITIcs 266-67 (1959) ("The bonds of fellowship that pro-
pinquity and interdependence encourage seem further strengthened by the common goals and common
values inherent in the equality of a small town.").
54. BISH, supra note 29, at 51.
55. SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, at 129 (arguing that "having set boundaries to a district ... defines
a relevant constituency not just by one aspect of its life at a moment in time but rather by the totality of
its political life over the years").
56. NICHOLAs K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 193 (1994).
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particular time.57 Local citizenship can be seen, not simply as a matter of resi-
dence, but as "primarily a relation of membership" in an on-going entity. 58
Local autonomy enables such communities to govern themselves.
Boundaries are essential to the definition of territorial community. The ex-
tent or composition of a particular territorial community is rarely self-evident.
Place is an informal concept. People may share a sense of place in general but
disagree on the spatial distinctiveness of areas. By circumscribing discrete bits
of territory, boundaries describe particular place-based communities. They
thereby bring "clarity" to the definition of place and "provide a basis for think-
ing of places as different from one another. '59 In a world of multiple places,
boundaries bound places off from each other, telling us where one place ends,
another begins, and which particular territorial spots constitute which particular
places. This is pivotal if places are to be the basis for government organiza-
tion-that is, if territorial communities are to become local governments.
Boundaries determine the territorial contours of territorial communities. In so
doing they bring about the wedding of "geographic expanses to political au-
thority" essential to the operation of local government. 60
B. Boundaries and the Powers and Duties of Local Governments
The centrality of boundaries to local autonomy is repeatedly demonstrated
by the basic tenets of local government law. Only rarely the subject of litiga-
tion, the connection between boundaries and the structure of local governments
is virtually axiomatic: Boundaries typically determine such crucial issues as
the electorate for local elections, the extent of local revenue-raising authority,
the ambit of local services, and the scope of local regulatory power.
The right to vote in local elections is nearly always limited to people physi-
cally resident within local boundaries. In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tusca-
loosa,6' the Supreme Court sustained a state law limiting the local franchise to
residents of the local jurisdiction, determining that a "government unit may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those
who reside within its borders."'62 The Court has also observed that such resi-
dency requirements are "necessary to preserve the basic conception of a polit-
ical community. '63
57. See MAX WEBER, THE CITY 80-89 (Don Martindale & Gertrud Neuwirth eds. & trans., 1958)
(describing historical characteristics of"urban communities").
58. SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, at 72; see also ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRE-
SENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1850, at 37-38 (1987) ("Before the [American] Revolution, no
American colony systematically based its representation on population.... Each geographic unit was
[instead] thought to be an organic, cohesive community .... )
59. GREcORY R. VEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND MET-
ROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 40-41 (1991).
60. Id. at 33-34.
61. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
62. Id. at 68-69.
63. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). This does not necessarily mean that states or
localities cannot expand the franchise to nonresidents with some ties to the community. See Duncan v.
Coffee County, 69 F.3d 88, 94-98 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding inclusion of city residents, who are also
county residents, in electorate for county school district even though city residents generally attend city
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Local boundaries are central to the raising and spending of local revenue.
Local governments receive most of their revenue from local sources rather than
from higher levels of government. The principal source of locally-raised reve-
nue for municipalities is the property tax.64 As municipalities are generally
unable to tax property outside their corporate limits, 65 their revenue-raising ca-
pacity is largely determined by the value of property within their boundaries.
Other sources of local taxation are similarly bounded. Local sales taxes are
limited to transactions within local boundaries. Local income taxes are, as a
rule, doubly limited by local boundaries-they are usually limited to incomes
earned within the taxing locality by residents of the taxing locality. Only a tiny
number of cities is authorized to tax local earnings of nonresidents or outside
earnings of local residents.
66
Beyond limiting the scope of taxing authority, boundaries enable local gov-
ernments to restrict the application of local tax revenue to uses within their
borders and to prevent redistribution to other localities. Indeed, several state
courts interpret their constitutions to enable local governments to keep locally
raised property tax revenues within local borders. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that the state constitution's requirement of uniform taxation pro-
hibits the state from forcing a local school district to contribute its property tax
revenue to other districts. 67 Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court recently held
that their state constitution's reservation of the property tax to local govern-
ments precludes the state from redistributing property taxes raised in one local-
ity to another locality.
68
schools and county school district primarily served rural areas; although state could exclude city resi-
dents from county district elections, the decision to enfranchise "out-of-district" voters passed rational
basis test because they "have a substantial interest in the operation of the... school district"); Glisson v.
Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1965) (permitting enfranchisement of nonres-
idents who own property in the jurisdiction); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs of Chattanooga, 722 F. Supp.
380, 400 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (upholding statute authorizing municipalities to permit nonresidents to
vote); Snead v. City of Albuquerque, 663 F. Supp. 1084, 1087-89 (D.N.M. 1987) (upholding require-
ment that, in order to vote in municipal elections, nonresident property owners must have paid property
taxes in that municipality); Bjornestad v. Hulse, 281 Cal. Rptr. 548, 563-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (up-
holding enfranchisement of nonresident landowners). But see Locklear v. North Carolina State Bd. of
Elections, 514 F.2d 1152, 1155 (1975) (holding that state statutes allowing city residents to vote in
county school board elections unconstitutionally diluted the votes of the county electorate). These ex-
tensions of the franchise are often challenged as dilutions of residents' voting rights. Generally, courts
find that a state may extend the local franchise to nonresidents if it made a reasonable determination that
those nonresidents have an interest in the operation of the local government. See, e.g., Glisson, 346 F.2d
at 137. The courts have not approved all such enfranchisements. For example, in Brown, the court held
that enfranchising nonresidents who own "trivial" amounts of local property would unconstitutionally
dilute residents' votes. 722 F. Supp. at 399.
64. See generally Dick Netzer, Property Taxes: Their Past, Present, and Future Place In Govern-
ment Finance, In URBAN FINANCE UNDER SIEGE 51, 51-63 (Thomas R. Swartz & Frank J. Bonello eds,,
1993) (stating that the property tax provides about one-fourth of all the revenue for American local
governments, with the balance supplied by state and federal governments).
65. 16 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.91 (Dennis Jensen &
Gail A. O'Gradney eds,, 3d ed. 1994).
66. See HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINOE, AMERICA's AILING CITIES: FiscAL HEALTH AND THE
DESIGN O URBAN. POLICY 132-34 (1989).
67. Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (Wis. 1976).
68. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 499-500 (Tex. 1991).
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Local boundaries frequently determine the scope of local services. The
Supreme Court has indicated that a local government's decision to prefer local
residents over nonresidents in the provision of local services is subject only to a
rational basis test.69 Moreover, localities are rarely obligated to provide serv-
ices beyond their borders. Indeed, in many states, localities actually lack the
authority to provide extralocal services and require a special legislative grant of
power before they are permitted to project their services across the local bound-
ary line.70 Even when a locality has been granted such authority, it is not re-
quired to exercise it.71 Furthermore, if a locality chooses to provide a service
to nonresidents, it may "discriminate, in respect to rates, between consumers
within and those outside" local borders.72
Pursuant to state authorization, many localities provide services, especially
utility services, beyond their borders. But in most states, the relationship of a
local government that provides service to a nonresident is akin to that of a
"business enterprise" to a consumer,73 rather than that of a city to its citizen.
This arrangement sometimes results in state oversight of the locality similar to
state regulation of privately owned public utilities.74 More commonly, this ap-
proach grants local governments the autonomy normally accorded private firms
and absolves localities of all but their private contractual obligations to service
recipients and potential service recipients, outside local borders.
Finally, local regulatory authority is generally confined within local bor-
ders. Unless the right to exercise a power outside its boundaries has been ex-
pressly delegated to a municipality, "the general rule is that the powers of a
municipal corporation are limited by its boundaries and cannot be exercised
outside them."'75 Municipal home rule powers, for example, typically do not
include any extraterritorial regulatory authority.
Many states have adopted legislation expressly granting municipalities lim-
ited powers in discrete zones of unincorporated territory immediately outside
69. County Bd. of Arlington v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that zoning
ordinance prohibiting commuters from parking in designated residential neighborhoods and providing
for free parking permits for residents of those neighborhoods does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause under a rational basis test).
70. CLAYTON P. Gumnrra, LOCAL GovwNrmErr LAW 936 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Bleick v. City of Papillion, 365 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Neb. 1985); see also Board of County
Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d 235, 245 (Colo. 1986) (holding that
"it is the public policy of this state that municipal utilities have total authority over the provision of
water service to users inside and outside municipal boundaries"). But see City ofTexarkana v. Wiggins,
246 S.W.2d 622, 627-28 (Tex. 1952) (holding that the city may not unreasonably discriminate between
residents and nonresidents when fixing utility rates).
73. See Bleick, 365 N.W.2d at 407 (holding that a city furnishing utility services to persons
outside city limits is engaged in a business enterprise and may charge nonresidents a higher rate for
those services); see also City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d at 625 (stating that "the municipal-
ity-owned utility is no different from the privately-owned utility [because] ... the economic nature of
the business has not changed").
74. See City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d at 625-27 (holding that city ordinance regard-
ing utility rates is subject to state common law duty of reasonableness).
75. 2 EUoENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.07 (Charles R.P. Keating
& Stephen M. Flanagan eds., 3d ed. 1988); see also 2 MICHAEL E. LmoNAT & JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL
Gova.RNMENr LAW § 13.10 (1993).
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municipal borders. These powers may include zoning, prohibiting nuisances,
licensing and regulation of businesses, criminal law enforcement, and general
health and safety regulation.76 The grant of such extraterritorial authority typi-
cally reflects state policies designed to control development on the urban fringe
or to provide basic regulation and services to fringe areas without the popula-
tion or services to support their own municipal governments. 77 Extraterritorial
regulatory authority is also sometimes associated with municipal expansion,
with the municipal exercise of extraterritorial authority serving as a halfway
step towards ultimate absorption of the extraterritorial zone.
Extraterritorial regulation, like extraterritorial service provision, is a re-
minder of the multiple concepts of local government extant in our legal culture.
Much of contemporary legal scholarship emphasizes the view of local govern-
ments as miniature polities. Indeed, the Supreme Court's determination that
the franchise rules that are constitutive of democratic representative govern-
ments must also apply to local governments reflects this vision.78 Yet, our
legal system has long emphasized two other attributes of local governments:
their role as quasi-firms providing proprietary services to "consumers" (not
"citizens") and their formal legal status as arms of the state carrying out state
policies and performing state functions locally.79 When acting as business en-
terprises providing proprietary services-such as water, electricity, and other
utility services often produced by private firms-local governments are not
necessarily limited by local boundaries. Similarly, local governments are not
necessarily limited by local boundaries when acting as instruments of the state.
When a state designates one local government to regulate an area outside the
local government's borders, the locality functions as an arm of the state rather
than as a locally accountable democratic government.
Extraterritorial service provision and regulation raise questions about the
accountability of the local government to the people receiving such services or
subject to such regulation, since the franchise usually does not accompany ex-
traterritorial authority. Recipients of extralocal service provision may exert
some control through the standard technique that the market accords consum-
ers: "exit" by choosing to purchase the service from another provider.80 If the
locality is the only available provider, the state may protect the extraterritorial
consumer through regulation in the same manner that it protects customers of
76. See generally 1 CHESaER JArmS ANmEAu, ANTiEAu's LOCAL GovPmErrr LAW: MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW § 5.12 (1994) (reviewing various grants of extraterritorial police powers); FRANK S.
SENGSTOCK, Ex-TRAiERRrroiAL PowERs IN TmE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962) (analyzing a range of
extraterritorial powers).
77. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments,
60 U. CHt. L. Rav. 339, 385-86 (1993).
78. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
79. See e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are
political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmen-
tal powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.").
80. See generally ALBERT 0. HRSCHMAN, ExIr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FiRMS, ORoANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-29 (1970) (describing how consumers exercise the exit option).
1131
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
monopolistic privately owned public utilities.81 For extraterritorial regulation,
the regulatee's only formal protection may be through political participation at
a higher level of government, typically the state.82 Insofar as our understand-
ing of local autonomy assumes the opportunity of people to take part in the
local decisions that affect them, however, this remedy denies regulatees local
autonomy.
Extraterritorial service provision and extraterritorial regulation serve to
loosen the otherwise tight association of local government with local bounda-
ries. Yet, by the same token, they underscore the close connection of local
boundaries with the role of local governments as decentralized democracies.
Boundaries play a weaker role when a locality acts as a quasi-proprietary ser-
vice provider or as an arm of the state. Conversely, boundaries are critical
when a local government is viewed as a locally elected and locally accountable
mechanism for self-governance.
By generally linking voting, taxation, public services, and regulation to lo-
cal boundaries, local government law attempts to square local governance with
the values that provide the normative underpinning for local autonomy. Thus
these legal rules seek to secure political participation for those who are affected
by local government decisionmaking, to assure the internalization of the costs
and benefits of local government action that is a precondition for efficiency,
and to provide for self-governance by distinctive local communities.
However, both boundaries and the legal rules that give them such enormous
significance in local governance will promote the values that drive the case for
local autonomy only when local boundaries are congruent with the scope of the
impact of a local government's decision. As a matter of democratic theory,
"[e]veryone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the
right to participate in that government. ' 83 When, as is frequently the case in
metropolitan areas, local governments have impacts on the interests of nonresi-
dents, the association of boundaries with local autonomy becomes problematic.
C. The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas
1. Boundaries and spillovers.
Boundaries are essential to the case for local autonomy, but they can also be
its Achilles' heel. Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or af-
fected by the decisions made within the boundaries. As then-Justice Rehnquist
observed, "[t]he imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral
the influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect indi-
81. City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. 1952) (holding a municipally-
owned utility to the same common law standards as a privately-owned utility when both are
monopolies).
82. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 76 (1978) (Stevens, J,, concurring) (not-
ing that the extraterritorial regulation challenged by the extraterritorial residents was the result of a
statute adopted by "[tlhe Alabama Legislature, which is elected by all of the citizens of the State includ-
ing the individual appellants").
83. ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUonOR IN A GooD SociE'T 64 (1970).
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viduals living immediately outside its borders."' 84 Such cross-border effects un-
dermine the democratic and efficiency arguments for local autonomy, since
both arguments assume that the consequences of local actions are borne primar-
ily within the acting locality.
Local borders probably always generated some spillovers, but in the past,
when local governments were set farther apart by unincorporated land, and peo-
ple focused more of their activities within the territorial limits of their particular
locality, the spillovers may have been relatively slight compared to the benefits
of limiting the determination of local matters to people within a discrete local-
ity. The spillover problem is more acute today because local borders frequently
abut one another, and people range widely in their daily activities across multi-
ple local boundaries. In contemporary metropolitan areas, local governments
are sure to generate externalities and area residents are sure to be excluded
from participating in the decisions of many localities that have direct implica-
tions for their lives.
Cross-border effects are a form of extraterritorial regulation, and like extra-
territorial regulation, they are difficult to square with the model of local gov-
ernment as local democracy. These extraterritorial effects can be controlled
either by (a) action at a higher level of government, (b) exit from the affected
area, or (c) extension of the locality's borders to include all those affected
within the boundaries of the community.
The first option conflicts with the values inherent in decentralized decision-
making. The second option is difficult in contemporary metropolitan areas be-
cause the entire metropolitan area is often the affected extraterritorial area. Exit
from a region is far costlier and thus far less available than the easy migration
to an adjacent locality that the public choice model assumes. The third op-
tion-extending local borders to include all persons affected by local actions-
would internalize the consequences of local decisions but would also produce a
much larger government unit, which is in tension with the participation values
underlying the political case for local government. Similarly, wider borders
would lead to the amalgamation of many smaller localities into a few larger
ones, thereby eroding the multiplicity of localities and the opportunities for
easy exit that make the market model work.
2. Aggregate regional consequences of locally bounded regulation.
Local land use regulation and the costs of sprawl. The spillover metaphor
and the analogy to formal extraterritorial regulation suggest that the spillover
problem arises when one municipality takes action with an immediate effect on
people just across the border. But in contemporary metropolitan areas, the
most significant externalities may not involve the impact of one particular lo-
cality on its neighbor but may instead be a consequence of the aggregate of
local policies across the region.
84. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 69.
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Local governments are largely dependent on their own resources to fund
their own services. Conversely, local governments can reserve their local tax
base for local purposes and protect it from the claim of other localities. Each
locality, thus, has "natural economic interests" 85 in using its revenue-raising
and land use regulatory powers to attract new residents and firms that add more
to the per capita tax base than they will cost in local services. They similarly
have an incentive to exclude new residents and activities that cost more in
services or loss of local amenities than they contribute in tax base.86 Local
land use regulations can be used to drive up the cost of housing in a locality and
to exclude other locally undesirable land uses, thereby creating a de facto price
of entry that serves to exclude those residents, firms, and land uses that do not
add to net local wealth.87
A locality's action excluding particular land uses or driving up the cost of
land in the community can displace activity to other localities. Although an
individual locality is typically not big enough by itself to affect the regional
housing market or the siting of locally undesirable but regionally necessary
land uses, local land use controls can have a ripple effect across the region.
When one locality acts to exclude a use, its neighbors may feel compelled to
adopt comparable regulations to protect themselves from the growth they fear
will be diverted to them by the initial locality's regulation. As a result, exclu-
sionary regulation can spread throughout a region.
By increasing housing costs in more developed parts of the metropolitan
area, local land use regulation can force new households to exurban and rural
communities at the perimeter of the metropolitan area.88 Metropolitan trans-
portation networks permit people to commute over considerable distances and,
in effect, help create regional housing and labor markets of considerable territo-
rial scope. Indeed, many metropolitan areas have experienced far greater terri-
torial expansion than population growth. Over the last quarter-century, the
population of the New York metropolitan area grew 5 percent, but the devel-
oped land in the area increased by 61' percent;89 similarly, in the 1970s and
1980s, metropolitan Chicago's population grew 4 percent, while its territory
expanded 46 percent. 90 Some of this territorial growth is due to exclusionary
land use regulation by central suburbs, which forces new development to outly-
85. Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Exclusionary Zoning: Local Property Taxation and the
Unique-Ubiquitous Resource Distinction, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1671, 1724 (1979).
86. "[The poor usually cost more in local services than they contribute in [local] taxes." ScHNei-
DER, supra note 46, at 126; see also DowNs, supra note 14, at 23 (observing that competition to attract
new residents and businesses means that local leaders and government officials "strongly desire to mini-
mize the number of low-income residents within their communities' boundaries"); LADD & YINGa,
supra note 66, at 85-86 (arguing that higher concentrations of low-income residents increase the costs of
general governmental services, police service, and fire service).
87. Localities can also use targeted tax cuts, service provision, eminent domain, or land use regu-
lations to attract residents and firms that will add to the local tax base.
88. See, e.g., Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Con-
trols on Housing Prices, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 149, 150 (1987) (describing the inflationary effect of local
land use controls on land development).
89. P IRCE, supra note 3, at 28.
90. Id.
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ing areas where land prices tend to be lower and "the political climate, at least
initially, is more favorable to development." 9' People can move to outlying
areas while continuing to work in more central locations. Similarly, firms can
relocate to outlying sites while continuing to draw workers from the rest of the
region.
This "leapfrog" pattern of development,92 in which local land use regula-
tion drives households and firms to move to less restrictive outlying areas, has
considerable costs. The extension of metropolitan areas consumes open space
and environmentally sensitive areas, displacing land uses that contribute to the
regional quality of life. Spreading metropolitan areas create a demand for ex-
pensive new infrastructure-streets, sewers, fire stations, schools-in growing
communities on the urban fringe.93 Workers forced by land use restrictions to
live on the edge of a metropolitan area will commute more, "which reduces
their real incomes unless they enjoy commuting. '94 As a result of the sprawl-
ing nature of development in most metropolitan areas, people must travel
longer distances to work, shop, or play than if growth were more concen-
trated.95 The dispersed pattern of regional development effectively precludes
the use of mass transit, which requires that most journeys be concentrated in a
limited number of destinations. 96 As a result, metropolitan area populations
increasingly depend on the automobile, leading to increased traffic conges-
tion,97 air pollution, and highway construction.
Local regulations that drive up the price of housing, reduce population den-
sity, and push new development to the metropolitan periphery affect the struc-
ture of the regional transportation network and impose costs on households
throughout the region. The deconcentration of metropolitan areas is not solely
or even primarily attributable to local regulation. New developments in trans-
portation and improved communications technologies have reduced the benefits
of central location, while the increased role of information rather than physical
inputs in production has loosened the ties of particular firms to particular
places, freeing them to relocate to cheaper locations on the metropolitan periph-
ery. Federal subsidies for highways and federal tax benefits and mortgage
91. WILLIAM A. FiscaEL, Do GROWrH CONTROLS MATTER?: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON THE EFEcnvEN sS AND EmCIcENcY OF LocAL GOVERNTMNT LAND USE REGULATION 55 (1990).
92. See, e.g., Terry D. Morgan, Joint Planning in Arizona, in STATE & REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING: IMPLEMENTING NEW METHODS FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT 216, 217 (Peter A. Buchsbaum
& Larry J. Smith eds., 1993).
93. See, e.g., PEiRCE, supra note 3, at 132 (noting the "immense public cost" of duplicative infra-
structure on the metropolitan fringe).
94. FiscHEL, supra note 91, at 56.
95. Ifjobs were dispersed as much as housing, commuting time and distances might not be signifi-
cantly affected by the dispersed pattern of metropolitan development. While jobs and workplaces have
spread through the metropolitan area, they are still not as deconcentrated as housing: Time lost to
commuting has therefore increased. See DowNs, supra note 14, at 7-9.
96. See DowNs, supra note 14, at 8. As a result, low-density metropolitan areas "cannot efficiently
support mass transit." Id; see also Elliot D. ScIar & Walter Hook, The Importance of Cities to the
National Economy, in DESTINIES, supra note 2, at 48, 57 (arguing that "low density suburbanization has
undermined the viability of... public transportation").
97. For a discussion of the impact of "[tihe growing traffic congestion associated with the U.S.
metropolitan development pattern" on the economy, see Sclar & Hook, supra note 96, at 57-59.
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guarantees favoring new single-family homes have further encouraged the
deconcentration of residents. Cultural preferences for detached housing over
multi-family dwellings and for single-driver automotive commuting over mass
transit have played a role in the low-density pattern of metropolitan develop-
ment. But the decentralized local government system-which encourages indi-
vidual localities to use land use policy to pursue local fiscal goals-has had an
impact.98 More importantly, the local government system makes it difficult for
localities to take action to control sprawl.
The fundamental feature of contemporary metropolitan governance is the
operation of locally bounded fiscal and regulatory autonomy in regions where
economic and social activity transcends local boundaries. Each local govern-
ment has an economic incentive to pursue its own local goal of attracting new
tax base contributors while excluding net service cost demanders. As Mark
Schneider has observed, "[t]he importance of the service/tax ratio is built into
the very structure of local government." 99 A locality that did not act to maxi-
mize its per capita tax base-that is, one wealthy enough or attractive enough
to lure new residents or firms but that did not restrict land uses to exclude those
in-migrants who did not contribute to local net wealth-would presumably,
sustain an influx of residents or activities that would lower the per capita tax
base or, due to congestion and increased use of local services, increase the ratio
of service costs to tax base.
Interlocal competition may operate to hold down taxes and service costs
within local boundaries. But when locally self-interested regulation causes re-
gionwide exclusionary land use policies, competition between locally bounded
governments can produce results that are costly to the people of the region as a
whole.
Interlocal fiscal disparities and the metropolitan economy. Boundaries, as
they are currently used in the local government system, reflect and reinforce
inequalities in the cost and quality of local services. Local public services are
funded primarily by the local tax base, much as localities can reserve their tax
bases for their own uses and protect them from the claims of other localities.
As a result, a locality with a more ample per capita tax base can provide better
services at a lower tax rate without having to support services in other locali-
ties, while poorer localities have to tax themselves at higher rates but generate
revenues sufficient only to fund relatively inferior local services.
More affluent localities can also use their regulatory authority to maintain
their preferred fiscal position. To the extent that more affluent localities are
able to deploy exclusionary zoning techniques as an informal wealth test that
keeps out newcomers who bring less to the locality in tax base than they cost in
local services, these localities can continue to offer better services and/or hold
down their taxes. Less affluent localities are nominally free to compete for
more affluent residents and new residents, but if they start out having less to
offer in terms of high quality services or low taxes there is, in practice, rela-
98. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 6, at 36.
99. SCHNEIDER, supra note 46, at 210.
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tively little they can do to attract the affluent or increase their per capita tax
base.' 00 The combination of local control over land use within local borders
and local fiscal autonomy, thus, sustains a hierarchy of wealth and reinforces
the differences in tax burdens and local service quality among localities in most
metropolitan areas.
The consequences of the local tax base-service-regulation nexus are com-
pounded by the concentration of poor people in poorer localities.101 Poverty in
metropolitan areas is increasingly concentrated in the older, so-called central
city and in older suburbs.' 0 2 These localities typically suffer disproportionately
from higher crime, deteriorated structures, aging infrastructure, greater conges-
tion, and a range of social ills. The presence of poor people in a locality tends
to drive up the per capita cost of local services. 10 3 These areas, thus, have
greater spending needs but less revenue-raising capacity than more affluent lo-
calities. Taxpayers in localities with large concentrations of the poor are likely
to be subject to higher tax rates, to receive lower quality basic services, and to
have a greater incentive to exit-which places an even greater tax burden on
those who are left behind.
The interlocal inequalities due to local fiscal autonomy and interlocal com-
petition for tax base are evident; what is probably less clearly appreciated is
how this system may damage the well-being of entire metropolitan regions.
More affluent parts of metropolitan regions do not necessarily gain at the ex-
pense of the more fiscally straitened localities. Rather, the opposite is often
true: When a lack of local resources to fund local services contributes to the
economic decline of poorer localities that may ultimately hurt more affluent
areas, too.
Metropolitan areas often function as interdependent economic regions. A
number of studies have found close relationships between the economic health
of the central city and that of the surrounding area.' 04 In general, as the dispar-
ity in per capita income between the central city and its suburbs rises, the over-
all economic health of the metropolitan region declines.' 05 A 1992 National
League of Cities study of the eighty-five largest metropolitan areas between
1988 and 1991 found that in metropolitan areas where the disparity in per cap-
100. Id. at 130-38; see also DOWNS, supra note 14, at 22 (noting that suburbs tend to be segre-
gated by income group, which reinforces the difficulties of the poor in trying to escape poverty).
101. See, e.g., Richard Child Hill, Separate and Unequal: Government Inequality in the Metropo-
lis, 68 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1557, 1560 (1974) (stating that "the concentration of low-income working
class and the unemployed in the center city and inner ring suburbs has increased").
102. In 1960, the per capita income in the central cities was 5% greater than the per capita income
of metropolitan area suburbs. In 1973, central city per capita income had dropped to 96% of suburban
incomes. By 1980, this ratio was 89%. By 1990, central city incomes per capita were just 84% of
suburban incomes. LARRY C. LEDEBUR & VLLIAm R. BARNES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF Crris, CrrY
DisTREtss, METROPOLITAN DISPARITIs AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1-2 (1992). Similarly, in 1979, the
percentage of central city residents below the poverty line was 15.6%-compared to 7.1% for the rest of
metropolitan areas. In 1989, the central city poverty rate was 18.1%-compared to 8% for the rest of
the metropolitan area. Id. at 6, fig. 5.
103. LADD & YINGER, supra note 66, at 199.
104. See, e.g., H. V. Savitch, David Collins, Daniel Sanders & John P. Markham, Ties That Bind:
Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region, 7 Econ. Dev. Q. 341, 342 (1993).
105. Savitch et a]., supra note 17, at 67-69.
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ita incomes between the central city and the rest of the metropolitan area was
greater than average, the metropolitan areas sustained a net decline in employ-
ment growth. By contrast, those areas where the income disparity was less than
average had modest employment growth. Areas with near parity in per capita
income or in which the city had higher per capita income showed even greater
employment growth.'
0 6
A second National League of Cities study of seventy-eight major metropoli-
tan areas found a strong linkage between changes in central city incomes and
changes in suburban incomes in the 1980s.107 No metropolitan area studied
experienced high suburban income growth without some significant city in-
come growth as well. Conversely, in most of the metropolitan areas where per
capita central city incomes declined, per capita suburban incomes also fell. In-
deed, in 82 percent of the regions, city and suburban incomes moved in the
same direction. Overall, city income growth lagged behind suburban growth,
but the most robust suburban growth was generally associated with growing
city economies. Another study, limited to twenty-eight metropolitan areas in
the Northeast and North Central regions, confirmed that "it is unlikely that a
metropolitan area's suburban economic performance, as measured by income
growth, is strong relative to other suburban areas if the metropolitan area has
declining central city incomes."' 0 8
The study of Northeast and North Central metropolitan areas also found
that while there was no connection between city and suburban population
growth in the 1960s, there was a close connection between city and suburban
population growth and city and suburban employment growth in the 1970s and
1980s. In the 1960s suburban growth apparently substituted for city growth:
People left declining cities for suburbs in the same region. But in the 1970s
and 1980s, in metropolitan areas marked by low city growth or outright city
decline, the suburbs experienced decline or only sluggish growth as well. Sub-
urbs grew only in metropolitan areas with growing cities.1°9 In the Northeast
and North Central metropolitan areas, at least, "[c]ontinued suburban growth
has become increasingly dependent on the overall desirability of the region."" 10
When a central city experiences severe decline, its more mobile residents and
firms apparently leave the metropolitan region rather than merely fleeing to the
suburbs.
The "high correlation between city and suburban growth in employment,
income, and population"' I I suggests that the metropolitan area is "an economi-
cally and socially integrated urban identity"'" 2 whose various component local
106. LFDEEUR & BARNES, supra note 102, at 14-16.
107. LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, "ALL IN IT To-
GETHER": CITIES, SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS 1 (1993).
108. Richard Voith, City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements?, FED. REsER E
BANK PHULA. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 29.
109. Id. at 25-26. Thus, it is "uncommon to find suburbs that are experiencing robust growth
while the central city is in severe decline." Id. at 30.
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id.
112. Salins, supra note 14, at 149.
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parts tend to rise or fall together. The central city typically shapes outsiders'
images of the region and thereby determines the region's capacity to attract
firms, high-skilled workers, and tourists and conventioneers. 1 3 Notwithstand-
ing the relative deconcentration of urban living today compared to the immedi-
ate postWar period, central cities still play critical roles in metropolitan
economies. Even as new manufacturing, corporate services, commercial activ-
ity, and employment migrate to suburban nodes and peripheral "edge cities,
' 14
central cities remain focal points for economic production, higher education,
health care, and entertainment.' 15 Nearly half of suburban households have at
least one family member who works in the central city. 1 6 Consequently, it is
not surprising that suburban housing prices are affected by employment growth
in the central city. 117 Most suburban residents depend on the city for major
medical services, and nearly half have household members who either currently
attend an institution of higher education based in the city or intend to do so
within five years.'1 s
Central cities continue to be the setting of many specialized activities, busi-
ness services, and cultural amenities that serve the surrounding metropolitan
region. 19 Because of this cultural and commercial preeminence, central cities
provide the best opportunity for the economically and politically valuable face-
to-face interactions of regional political, business, media, labor, education, and
other leaders:120 "Although a few suburban edge cities also have large agglom-
113. See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 3, at 131 (stating that "a region is known first and foremost by
the physical image, the character and success of its center city").
114. Joel Garreau has dubbed the new urban centers springing out of suburbs and farmland "edge
cities." See generally JoEt. GARREAu, EDGE CrrY: LIFa ON THE NEv FRONTIER (1991); see also Fish-
man, supra note 6, at 27-28 (detailing the growth of "new cities" in former suburban enclaves). Com-
munity patterns have changed along with job markets. See DowNs, supra note 14, at 46-47. A study of
the 60 largest metropolitan areas found that the central city share of metropolitan area jobs declined
from 52% in 1976 to 47% in 1986. Id. Two-thirds of all new jobs in these metropolitan areas were
located outside the central cities. Id. at 47.
In the 1980s the movement of jobs out of the central cities may have abated. See Sclar & Hook,
supra note 96, at 49-50. Central city jobs are higher paying in most metropolitan areas. "Wages of
central city jobs are on average 20 percent higher than suburban jobs, and this earnings gap has been
widening in many metropolitan areas, though many of these jobs are held by suburban residents." Id. at
50.
115. DowNs, supra note 14, at 54-55.
116. Arthur S. Goldberg, Americans and Their Cities: Solicitude and Support, in NATIONAL IN-
TEREST, supra note 17, at 37, 45.
117. See Richard Voith, A Clear Link: Central City Employment Growth and Suburban House
Values, FED. RESERVE BANK PuIA. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 32, 32-33; see also Goldberg, supra
note 116, at 45 (in a survey of a sample of the 22% of Americans who do not live in one of the nation's
largest cities but live within 20 miles of such a city, 46% of suburban home owners believed that "a
long-term economic decline in the city would reduce the market value of their homes").
118. Goldberg, supra note 116, at 45.
119. As Anthony Downs points out:
High-fashion retail outlets, major medical centers, operas and other cultural activities, and
specialized wholesale suppliers serving a thin but widely spread market need the combination
of one location accessible to the entire metropolitan area and the area's large mhrket to thrive.
Central cities or sites near them remain the most effective locations for such activities.
DowNs, supra note 14, at 53; see also Voith, supra note 108, at 24 (noting the benefits of placing
businesses near each other and in close proximity to a large labor force).
120. See, e.g., William K. Tabb, What are the Limits of Government? What are its Obligations?,
in URBAN FINANCE UNrDR SIEGE, supra note 64, at 139, 141.
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erations of facilities, only one spot within each region can be the habitual gath-
ering place of most movers and shakers."
121
The economically intertwined nature of localities within metropolitan areas
extends beyond central cities and suburbs. Although firms may no longer be
concentrated in the old central cities, most regional workplaces are concen-
trated in "commercial nodes of one kind or another-in either downtowns, or
at select locales (airports, freeway interchanges), or along specific highway
strips. So-called edge cities are not isolated or scattered pieces of development,
but compact commercial districts."122 The firms in these districts draw their
workers from throughout the metropolitan area and depend on other localities
to educate the next generation of workers and to provide basic public services
and amenities to workers and their families. To the extent that the more fis-
cally straitened localities of residence are unable to provide proper education,
policing, sanitation, parks, and the like to their residents, the firms that need
those workers, and the residents of the more affluent localities who depend
upon those firms, will bear a part of the cost. Thus the consequences of inade-
quate local schools, unsafe local streets and homes, unaffordable local housing,
and unreliable local transportation networks in some localities may be borne by
all localities throughout the region, including those localities providing high-
quality services to their own residents.
In the short run, residents of more affluent localities may benefit, in terms
of lower taxes and higher quality services, from the local-boundary-based
structure of metropolitan areas. In the long run, however, interlocal competi-
tion, interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and infra-
structure in central cities can bring down the economic base of the region as a
whole, making affluent areas as well as poorer ones less well-off than they
might have been had the region as a whole invested more in poorer localities.
The local government system is clearly not the only cause of the difficulties
many local governments face in providing basic public services to their resi-
dents. The costs of public services may be driven up by excessive bureaucracy,
poor management, costly union contracts, wasteful programs, and the limita-
tions on citizens' ability to monitor big city government. For the most part,
however, local fiscal health depends primarily on the health of the regional
economy and on social conditions within the locality, which are largely beyond
the power of localities, particularly poorer localities, to control.' 23 Although
localities compete vigorously for economic development, local policies have
relatively weak effects on the locations of new firms.' 24 Similarly, municipali-
ties' efforts to attract wealthy families are often ineffectual: Families tend to
locate in communities whose socioeconomic characteristics are consistent with
121. DowNs, supra note 14, at 52; see also Fishman, supra note 6, at 42 (describing how the
"skyscraper cores" of many central cities are still the focal point for "high status," "high rents," and
"power lunches"). Downs acknowledges that "advances in communications have diminished the impor-
tance of face-to-face contacts," but nevertheless contends that electronic contacts cannot "convey the
same completeness of meaning as face-to-face contacts." DowNs, supra note 14, at 52.
122. Savitch et al., supra note 104, at 346.
123. LADD & YINGER, supra note 66, at 289-93.
124. See ScHNErDER, supra note 46, at 147-63.
1140 [Vol. 48:1115
May 1996] LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY PROBLEM
their own. 125 Macroeconomic factors, broader social and cultural trends, fed-
eral and state welfare policies, and regional economic conditions all have a far
greater effect on the rates of employment, poverty, and crime than do the deci-
sions of the local governments themselves. The structure of the local govern-
ment system, however, does affect the quantity and quality of the local public
services provided.
By dividing the metropolitan area tax base and limiting spending to the
fiscal responsibilities within local borders, boundaries permit residents and
firms in affluent localities to avoid the costs of providing services in poorer
localities. Indeed, many people choose to settle in more affluent localities-or
to incorporate their localities in the first place-just to insulate themselves
from the fiscal needs of the rest of the region. Yet, the inability of poorer
localities to educate their children, to control crime, and to provide basic infra-
structure services may have destabilizing regionwide consequences. Due to
these pervasive externalities, the "metropolitan market place" may also gener-
ate a prisoner's dilemma in which interlocal competition caused by local fiscal
and regulatory authority, the multiplicity of local boundaries, and the ease of
movement across them ultimately harms both affluent and poor localities.
3. Local boundaries and the metropolitan community.
Boundaries determine a community's territorial dimensions, electorate, rev-
enue base, service responsibilities, and regulatory authority. Only a bounded
locality can become a political "self" capable of self-government. But bounda-
ries do not simply mark off or identify existing communities: Rather to a con-
siderable extent, boundaries create communities. Boundaries may even come
before the people, 126 and they certainly precede the shared history and dense
web of interpersonal interactions that give meaning to the notion of community.
As Nancy Schwartz noted in her discussion of Florentine government, wards
were "[n]eighborhoods [n]ot [n]atural [b]ut [c]reated."'127 Wards became
neighborhoods in part because they were officially bounded, were used as polit-
ical units, and thus, became a focus of obligation, sentiment, and identity.
128
The role of boundaries in creating self-governing politico-territorial local
units is particularly important in American metropolitan areas. Local boundary
125. See id. at 138-44.
126. See, e.g., In re Incorporation of New Morgan, 590 A.2d 274, 278 (Pa. 1991) (upholding
incorporation of borough in order to develop the land and create a mixed-use commercial/residential
community). At the time of incorporation, there were only six occupied homes in the proposed borough.
Id. at 276.
127. ScirvARrz, supra note 52, at 113.
128. Id. at 113-15; see also William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, in AME~i-
CAN FEDERALIsM IN PERsPECrrvE 33, 46 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1967) (At the time of admission to the
union, the nonoriginal states "may not have been sufficiently diversified to justify" treatment as distinct
communities, but "they rapidly acquired ... consciousness of individuality."); c Russell Kirk, The
Prospects for Territorial Democracy in America, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AmERICAN
FEDERAL SVs'm 42, 43 & n.2 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963) (when first organized, most western states
"were mere parallelograms of prairie and desert and forest"; over time, though, the "institution and
practice" of self-government gave individual states "some distinct and peculiar character as political
territories, by fixing loyalties and forming an enduring structure of political administratioN').
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lines have often been drawn in order to take advantage of the opportunity local
government law provides incorporated communities to control local land use
and to escape from the fiscal burdens of the surrounding metropolitan re-
gion.129 In her study of the politics of municipal incorporation, Nancy Bums
described a process of boundary formation driven by profit and perhaps race.
Firms rather than residents often took the initiative in seeking formal local
boundaries-manufacturers sought tax havens or developers sought the regula-
tory authority necessary to make their developments attractive to potential buy-
ers. 130 The benefits of incorporation were often so great that the firms were
willing to assume the costs of an incorporation campaign.' 3 ' The willingness
of local residents to vote for incorporation, however, was strongly influenced
by the politics of race. Newly incorporated towns often had significantly lower
concentrations of African-American residents than did the counties from which
they were carved. 132 Whites saw incorporation as a means for separating them-
selves from African Americans.
133
Not only do boundaries create self-governing political units where no dis-
tinct community previously existed, but boundaries can shape the future of the
new community. Once bounded and incorporated, the locality has the power to
regulate land use and to design a mix of taxes and services that attracts settlers
the locality desires. Moreover, boundaries themselves-apart from the local
public policies of incorporated communities-can mold the demographic de-
velopment of the locality. As Gregory Weiher has pointed out, formal bounda-
ries clarify a place's "social and economic identity."'1 4 Local boundary lines
provide potential settlers with critical information about the conditions that may
be relevant in deciding where to settle.' 35 To the extent that local racial or
class characteristics matter when people decide where to live, formal boundary
lines may make an area's ethnic composition or social status more evident,
thereby directly facilitating an interjurisdictional sorting by race or class.
136
Moreover, by creating local politico-territorial communities, local bounda-
ries may obscure recognition of the broader metropolitan community. The lo-
calities within major metropolitan areas are not "communities" within the
traditional sense of the term. They are not the focal points for most of the
activities of their residents-the place where residence, business, friendship,
family, and social activities converge. Rather, residents typically live, work,
shop, and go to school in different communities. Most metropolitan localities
129. See generally GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPO-
RATION (1981) (describing the migration of the middle-class to small-scale, low-taxation cities and the
use of municipal incorporation to maximize resources per capita).
130. NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION or AMERICAN LOCAL GovERNMENTs: PRIVATE VALUES IN
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 23-24 (1994).
131. Id. at 98-108.
132. Id. at 89-91.
133. Id. at 83-91.
134. WrEER, supra note 59, at 35.
135. Id. at 59-60.
136. See id. at 87-143.
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lack their own distinctive local economies137 and town centers' 38 much as their
residents lack "geographic rootedness"' 39 and the sense of shared history and
tradition that are part of the romance of community.
Only the metropolitan area is expansive enough to include most of the daily
activities and social and economic concerns of the residents of metropolitan
area localities. Yet it is difficult for most area residents to conceive of the
metropolitan area as a community. With millions of people scattered across a
sprawling network of localities, the contemporary metropolitan area typically
"lacks any definable borders, a center or a periphery."140 The economic and
cultural relations that bind a region together are largely invisible to most resi-
dents, who are likely to view their home locality as their community and to
view the metropolitan area as little more than a Census designation.
41
Local boundaries compound the difficulty of creating a sense of metropoli-
tan community. By tying political participation, services, taxes, and regulation
together, local boundaries tend to make localities the focus of their residents'
loyalties, concerns, and identities. With local borders narrowing their range of
vision, residents of one locality may not recognize that they are affected by the
actions of other local governments or have a stake in the well-being of residents
of other localities in the metropolitan area.'
42
Instead, local boundaries often become the basis of interlocal conflicts.' 43
To the extent that boundaries affect land use regulation and fiscal disparities
and, thereby, contribute to the class and racial differentiation of localities
within the metropolitan area, they create a psychological separation among
metropolitan localities far more difficult to bridge than physical distance alone.
Local boundaries, thus, can exacerbate divisions within the metropolitan area
137. See JAmEs HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NowHi.u,: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 186 (1993).
138. Peirce notes that post World War II suburbs, where an increasing portion of metropolitan
area residents live, are "typically places that are physically spread out and lacking town centers."
PmRcE , supra note 3, at 306.
139. Id.
140. Fishman, supra note 6, at 37.
141. See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 12, at 19 ("[Ihe Boston metropolitan area remains more an
artificial statistical and cartographic construct than a popularly perceived economic, social, and political
entity.").
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Region Around New York Sees Ties to City Faltering, N.Y.
TiNiEs, Dec. 1, 1991, at Al (noting that "half of all regional residents say events in New York City have
'hardly any impact' at all in their lives"); Peter Kerr, Camden Forces Its Suburbs to Ask, What If a City
Dies?, N.Y. TiNiEs, Sept. 7, 1989, at Al (describing stark cultural and economic distinctions between
Camden and its suburbs); see also JACKSON, supra note 8, at 272-74 (describing how suburbs increas-
ingly stress their distinctions from, rather than their connection to, the central city).
143. Alan Ehrenhalt describes the relationships among the localities of the Monongahela Valley,
just east of Pittsburgh-an area hit hard by the departure of the steel industry and the consequent loss of
jobs and tax base. Although many of the municipalities were "essentially bankrupt' they found it diffi-
cult to cooperate with each other and reach agreements to cut the costs of local services: "[Tihe Mon
Valley communities had deep-seated emotional rivalries with each other, built on subtle shadings of
ethnicity and deepened by blood-and-guts athletic competition that turned residents of one borough into
life-long antagonists of the one next door.... 'Within the town, people cooperated. ... They did not
cooperate across the town line.'" Alan Ehrenhalt, Cooperate or Die, GovwRING, Sept. 1995, at 28, 30
(quoting a local minister).
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and make it even more difficult for area residents to recognize their shared
interests or their membership in a metropolitan community.
Im. LOCAL BOUNDARIES AND METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE
A. Public Choice and Voluntary Cooperation
The public choice school is comfortable with both the emergence of metro-
politan areas and the role of local boundaries in them. For public choice the-
ory, the metropolitan area solves a major problem of governance by providing
an efficient mechanism for matching public goods and services to citizen pref-
erences and for enhancing citizens' capacity to monitor government perform-
ance. Indeed, the allocative efficiency that public choice finds in the local
government system is actually contingent on metropolitanization because only
metropolitan areas have both a large number of small localities in close proxim-
ity to each other and a general separation of work from residence, so that
households can move relatively easily from one locality to another without
changing jobs.
Public choice theorists also recognize that general purpose regional govern-
ments are not necessary to achieve economies of scale in the provision of met-
ropolitan area infrastructure. The traditional argument for a unified
metropolitan government assumed that only such a regional government could
have the institutional capacity and fiscal resources necessary for capital-inten-
sive public works that promote regional development, such as water supply,
waste water treatment, solid waste disposal, airports, highways, and mass
transit. 144 But, as public choice scholars point out, the scale economy problem
can be solved without centralized regional governments. Instead, local govern-
ments can purchase services from each other, enter into joint agreements for
planning, financing, and delivery of services, and create or seek state creation
of special limited-purpose districts to supply capital-intensive services on a re-
gional basis. 145 All of these devices are in common use today. 146 They enable
local residents and firms to retain control of most regulatory and service-provi-
sion decisions and to defend their property tax bases from external demands,
while reducing the costs of obtaining modem physical infrastructure.
By enabling localities to pool their resources and provide or receive serv-
ices beyond their borders, interlocal agreements and joint ventures reduce the
significance of local boundaries.' 4 7 Local political autonomy does not require
144. See, e.g., LUTHER HALSEY GuLicK, THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS 24
(1962) (arguing that "area-wide problems" can only be solved in their entirety, rather than piece by
piece).
145. See ROBERT L. BISH & VINCENT OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING URBAN GOVERNMENT: METRO-
POLITAN REFORM RECONSIDERED 59-69 (1973). For a specific example of a small locality that lowered
its property taxes by purchasing all of its public services from outside sources, see BISH, supra note 29,
85-91 (describing the incorporation of Lakewood, California).
146. See, e.g., DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHING-
TON 272-73, 277-78 (1995).
147. Typically, a local government may not enter a joint services agreement unless it is authorized
to provide that service itself. See, e.g., Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179
N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1970).
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economic autarky. From the public choice perspective, the key function of
local government is not the production of local public services, but rather the
articulation of demand for those services-that is, the determination of the
quantity and quality of public services that will be provided to, and paid for by,
the residents of the locality. The locality can contract with other governments
or private firms for the actual production of those services. 148
Because individual localities themselves decide whether to enter into in-
terlocal service agreements and joint ventures, these arrangements depart only
slightly from the traditional association of local autonomy with local bounda-
ries. As long as each local government ultimately decides which services to
provide at what CoSt, 1 4 9 local residents remain capable, through their oversight
and control of their local government, of determining basic features of the ser-
vice, even if the service is produced beyond local borders. 150
Special districts are an alternative approach to the boundary problem.
Rather than lower the interlocal boundary walls, special districts create a new
regionally bounded entity with a limited mandate to provide a service that
would benefit from regional economies of scale. But special district boundaries
are less significant than other local government boundaries: Special districts
are limited purpose governments, superimposed over the multiplicity of munic-
ipalities in a metropolitan area, but without general governmental authority
over the territory or its residents. Localities are not merged; rather, they retain
their distinctive decisionmaking authority over most local matters.
Although special districts entail the transfer of some power from the local
level to the regional body, their impact on local autonomy is limited in practice.
First, most regional special districts focus on the financing, construction, opera-
tion, and maintenance of physical infrastructure. Special districts generally
supply engineering solutions to technical problems; they do not, as a rule, di-
rectly engage in areawide social or economic regulation. In Oliver Williams'
terminology, they perform "system-maintenance functions" without impinging
on local autonomy over "life-style services," such as housing, police, or
schools.' 51
Second, most regional special districts are limited to performing a single
function, typically providing a quasi-proprietary service. They are generally
incapable of making broad regional policy determinations or reconciling con-
148. Parks and Oakerson characterize the provision of public services as resulting from collective
public choice processes to determine how much of each service to provide and how to pay for it, while
the production of public services refers to "the technical processes of combining resources to ... render
a service." Parks & Oakerson, supra note 29, at 21.
149. Cf. Vermont Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 215,
219-25 (Vt. 1988) (invalidating a service purchase agreement as an unlawful delegation of local power
because the agreement vested the service provider with the authority both to subject the purchasing
localities to debt and to determine the basic features of the service provided).
150. Moreover, the link between local borders and service-provision traditionally has been weaker
than other aspects of local autonomy because service-provision has been associated with the quasi-
proprietary model of local government. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
151. Oliver P. Williams, Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas,
48 Sw. Soc. Sc. Q. 299, 305-07 (1967).
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flicting regional needs. 152 Special districts, for example, may be authorized to
impose user charges for the services they provide and to issue bonds backed by
the service charges, but they typically lack authority to levy taxes. As a result,
special districts seem less than truly governmental153 and certainly do not cre-
ate regional governmental focal points that might threaten local autonomy.
Third, most regional special districts are run not by regionally elected offi-
cials but by appointees who are named to their positions either by locally
elected officials or by the state. Because appointed officials are not directly
accountable to the public, the public is likely to be less able to influence their
decisionmaking and less aware of their deliberations and activities. An ap-
pointed body is probably less capable than an elected body of building a sense
of regional community among area residents or of treating a region as a local
unit appropriate for self-government.' 54 An appointed regional board is also
likely to have less power over the component local governments than an elec-
tive body would. An appointed board lacks the legitimacy that comes from
popular election, and when appointed by local elected officials, regional board
members are unlikely to take positions at odds with those who named them to
the board in the first place.
As a result, limited purpose special districts are not much of a threat to local
autonomy: They allow people within metropolitan regions to obtain desired
physical infrastructure and related services at reasonable costs "without submit-
ting to more comprehensive forms of governance."' 55
To be sure, the use of interlocal agreements and special districts may result
in a loss of some of the efficiency benefits of interlocal competition. Interlocal
agreements may shift critical decisions concerning service production and de-
livery out of the community.' 56 If a joint service arrangement spans many
localities, then the residents of any particular locality may have difficulty moni-
toring service performance and gathering information concerning the costs and
quality of alternative service provision mechanisms. Special districts operating
at the regional level are particularly inconvenient to monitor. A special district
152. See PmRCE, supra note 3, at 318.
153. The Supreme Court has indicated that where a special district has a limited purpose and
discharges solely proprietary functions rather than a "traditional element of governmental sovereignty,"
the special district voting scheme is not subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement. Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355, 368-70 (1981); see also Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875,
880-88 (Cal. 1992) (holding that a special benefit assessment district created to finance metropolitan
transit system is not subject to one-person, one-vote requirement).
154. But see JOHN J. HARRIGAN & WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE TWIN CITIES REGION:
THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135-37 (1978) (outlining several reasons
why an appointed Council might be more accountable to the public).
155. Wallis, supra note 17, at 162.
156. As a result, some interlocal service agreements have been challenged as unlawful delegations
of municipal power. Furthermore, some agreements requiring one locality to make payments to another
have been challenged as violations of state constitutional rules prohibiting one governmental unit from
lending its credit to another. State courts have generally rejected these challenges. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258, 270 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (upholding as constitutional the joint creation by several cities of an agency to provide
power to the cities); Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Wyo. 1977) (same); see also DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, DAWN CLARK NETSCH, PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & JUDITH WELCH VEGNER, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 179-80 (1990).
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limited to the provision of a single or a very small number of services is only
rarely salient to area residents as a government. With boundaries drawn to deal
with a quasi-technological problem, special district borders often do not map on
to the borders of the local units-cities and counties-with which area resi-
dents are more familiar. Many localities fall within the jurisdiction of multiple,
overlapping districts and residents may have "difficulty ... even locating the
boundaries of special districts." 157 Moreover, with each district devoted to a
specific function, residents can "find it extremely difficult to keep track of what
is going on."' 58 As a result, participation in special district elections is ex-
tremely low-far lower than in elections for general purpose local govern-
ments.' 59 Of course, in the many districts administered by appointed officers,
the question of voter turnout does not even arise.
The central flaw in the public choice approach, however, is not the loss of
local control, but rather, the inability of metropolitan area localities to come to
grips with the regional prisoners' dilemma caused by local land use decision
making, local fiscal autonomy, and local responsibility for the costs of local
public services. Localities acting in their own self-interest will fail to make
optimal decisions because, in failing to take account of how their decisions
affect the welfare of the region as a whole, they may ultimately damage their
own well-being.
Local control over land use is a major source of metropolitan regional ex-
ternalities, but there are few, if any, voluntary interlocal agreements concerning
land use, zoning, planning, or housing. Localities simply do not enter into co-
operative arrangements under which some localities accept regionally neces-
sary but locally undesirable land uses. Similarly, localities rarely, if ever, agree
to desist from competing for development against other localities in the same
metropolitan area.' 60 And regional special districts rarely constrain or displace
157. BuRNs, supra note 130, at 12.
158. BIsH, supra note 29, at 52; cf DAHL & TumrE, supra note 40, at 141 ("Just as a central
nervous system would quickly become overloaded by a proliferation of specialized organs ... so the
costs of communication and information, and therefore of control, would become overwhelming if citi-
zens were confronted with an indefinite number of changing units."). For an instance of multiple, over-
lapping limited-purpose special districts in a region, see Jones & Rothblatt, supra note 4, at 399-400
(listing 20 of the "most important" regional and multicounty bodies in the Bay Area).
159. See Bums, supra note 130, at 12 (noting that a 2-5% rate of voter participation in post
formation elections is unusually high).
160. To be sure, municipalities in New Jersey regularly enter into regional cooperation agree-
ments under which a developing suburb makes payments to an older city to fund the construction or
rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing in the city. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(a) (West
1986). But these agreements do not exist because of the suburbs' voluntary and unprompted recognition
that their exclusionary practices impose costs on nonresidents or other localities in the region-or that
they, too, will ultimately suffer when other communities decline. Rather, these agreements are the
product of New Jersey's Mount Laurel litigation, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (NJ.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983),
where the state supreme court determined that New Jersey municipalities have a duty to provide for their
fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate-income housing. This decision eventually required
the state legislature to provide regional cooperation agreements as an alternative to increasing the
amount of affordable housing in the suburbs. For a detailed description of the Mount Laurel litigation,
see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 CoLuM. L.
Rav. 1, 48-56 (1990). New Jersey's regional fair share housing requirement appears unique. See Geor-
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local governments' authority to use their zoning, subdivision, or other land use
regulatory powers to affect the cost of housing within local borders' 6 ' or to
compete against other localities in the region for new economic
development.162
The rise and fall of federally inspired regional planning councils demon-
strates the lack of interest in voluntary interlocal cooperation on land use ques-
tions. In the 1960s and 1970s, many federal housing, mass transit, and urban
development programs required some comprehensive regional review and com-
ment process to determine the allocation of federal grants and loans for projects
in metropolitan areas. This regional review power was frequently vested in
councils of government ("COGs") that had been separately organized under
state legislation or created by voluntary interlocal agreement, Because of their
role as metropolitan planning organizations to review federal grant applica-
tions, COGs began to take on a regional planning function. In the 1980s, how-
ever, President Reagan abandoned regional review requirements and ultimately
eliminated most of the federally funded programs for which regional planning
had been required.163 Without their role as federal grant clearinghouses, the
regional COGs ceased to have an important planning function. Today they
provide information and services to their affiliated local governments "on such
matters as local government payroll management, landfills, police firing ranges,
fingerprint and ID systems, street maintenance, purchase and operation of
snow-removal equipment, counseling services, and emergency communica-
tions," but they lack "any significant authority" over land use decisions within
their regions.164
Like land use regulation, little voluntary interlocal cooperation addresses
the consequences of interlocal fiscal disparities. There are few reported in-
stances of voluntary payments by one locality to another to support public serv-
ices in the poorer locality. And notwithstanding the regional nature of
economic activity, voluntary interlocal agreements to distribute some of the
increase in local tax revenue attributable to regional economic growth are only
slightly less rare.' 65
gette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related Ex-
penses, 47 WASH. U. J. Ura. & CoNTEMp. L. 3, 43-44 (1995) (noting that no other state's low-income
housing plan is as "widescale" as New Jersey's).
161. For prominent exceptions to this rule, see KuNsrmE, supra note 137, at 204-06 (describing
Oregon's Metropolitan Service District); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Ann R. Danforth, Looking Beyond the
City Limits, Regional Approaches to the Growth Crisis, 22 URB. LAW. 701, 707-08 (1990) (same);
Martin, supra note 20, at 229-31 (describing Twin Cities Metropolitan Council); see also RusK, supra
note 9, at 64-65 (describing Montgomery County, Maryland's countywide Moderately Priced Dwelling
Unit Ordinance).
162. Strikingly, even the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has played a minimal role in regulat-
ing the interlocal competitions for a new football/baseball stadium, a convention center, and a megamall.
See Martin, supra note 20, at 232-36.
163. See WALKER, supra note 146, at 8, 274-75.
164. Kincaid, supra note 17, at 472-73; see also WALKER, supra note 146, at 274-75.
165. There appear to be two instances of voluntary interlocal tax base sharing: Louisville, Ken-
tucky and surrounding Jefferson County agreed to share tax bases for a period of twelve years starting in
1986, Savitch, et al., supra note 17, at 73 (noting that $4.3 million transferred from the county to the city
during the first five years of the agreement), and the communities in Montgomery County, Ohio (greater
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The lack of interlocal agreements on land use and local service funding is
not surprising. As long as cooperation is voluntary, no locality will cooperate
with another unless it sees that it will benefit from such cooperation. The bene-
fits of cooperation are most apparent in cases of physical infrastructure and
"systems-maintenance" activities. The residents of smaller localities may real-
ize that their own communities cannot provide an airport, waste treatment
plant, or pollution control facility at reasonable cost and that they would benefit
directly from sharing the costs of these facilities with other communities across
the region. Similarly, residents of localities may recognize their stake in, and
may be willing to support, metropolitan amenities located outside their particu-
lar locality.
166
The benefits of ceding local control over local land use regulation or tax
revenues are likely to be far less obvious. Control of local land use and tax
base are central purposes of local government. People incorporate local gov-
ernments in order to reap the benefits of local fiscal and regulatory autonomy.
People move to high tax base localities to enjoy better local services, just as
they rely upon local zoning to protect their homes, families, and immediate
neighborhoods from undesirable land uses. 167 Thus the loss of zoning auton-
omy and tax base immunity would be a major departure from current practice
and would require a major effort to persuade local residents of the benefits of
interlocal cooperation in these areas.
The large number of local governments in most metropolitan areas can cre-
ate a "tragedy" of the regional "commons." Residents of a particular locality
may not believe that their local zoning decisions contribute significantly to re-
gional sprawl, traffic congestion, and air pollution, or that their agreement to
refrain from exclusionary zoning would have regional benefits. Similarly, they
might not see that they have a stake in the quality of the services in another
locality or that their particular fiscal contribution to schools or to public safety
in another locality would generate much benefit for them.
Interlocal economic interdependency is probably not obvious to local resi-
dents. The increasing deconcentration of the major metropolitan areas has at-
tenuated the connection among particular localities, especially the ties between
the former central city and its suburbs. More and more metropolitan residents
live far from the central city (and from declining inner suburbs) and have little
Dayton) have agreed to use part of the increase in property tax revenues attributable to economic devel-
opment to fund new economic development programs, Allan D. Wallis, The Third Wave: Current
Trends in Regional Governance, 83 NAT'L Civic REv. 290, 297-98 (1994) (describing the Economic
Development Equity Fund).
The most celebrated instance of metropolitan interlocal tax base sharing is Minnesota's Metropoli-
tan Fiscal Disparities Act, which imposed a tax base sharing requirement on the municipalities in the
Twin Cities area. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473F.01-.13 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). See Village of Burns-
ville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532-33 (Minn. 1974) (holding that the Act's revenue sharing
scheme satisfied the Minnesota constitution's requirement that taxes be uniform upon the same class of
subjects).
166. For example, the voters in the six-county Denver metropolitan area approved special levies to
support museums, the zoo, botanical gardens, a performing arts center, and a baseball stadium. They
perceived the facilities to be of regional significance. Wallis, supra note 165, at 305-06.
167. See text accompanying notes 61-83 supra.
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contact with the city during their daily activities. Moreover, as the income gap
between rich and poor localities within a metropolitan region widens, the resi-
dents of prosperous localities are more likely to notice their own prosperity,
notwithstanding the poorer localities' decline, rather than see that they are do-
ing less well than suburbanites in regions marked by less severe interlocal fiscal
disparities.1 68 People in more affluent communities may not realize that in the
long run they will suffer from the deterioration of public education or public
safety in the poorer localities. In the short run, interlocal payments to support
public services in poorer localities entail measurable costs without apparent
gain. Under those circumstances, interlocal cooperation is unlikely to occur. 169
Moreover, even if residents of more affluent localities understand the nega-
tive regional externalities of locally self-interested regulatory and fiscal strate-
gies, it is doubtful that they could deal with the logistics of handling problems
such as sprawling development and interlocal fiscal disparities on a cooperative
basis. Cooperation is more likely to occur between adjacent municipalities
with direct stakes in each other's well-being or when the consequences of one
municipality's action are borne directly by the other. In the metropolitan set-
ting, the consequences of local land use regulation or of underinvestment in
basic public services are often borne not only by nearby localities but by locali-
ties throughout the region. Moreover, the metropolitan consequences of local
action arise not from the decisions of particular localities but from the aggre-
gate of local decisions affecting education, housing, safety, and environmental
quality. Given the lack of a direct nexus between a particular locality's work-
places and another's school system or zoning ordinance, it might not be rational
for one to provide direct assistance to the other. Enlightened self-interest might
lead some localities to see the benefits of cooperation, but the limited capacity
of any one locality to resolve regional problems may discourage even the en-
lightened locality from cooperating unless it was assured that other localities
would participate in a regionwide cooperative scheme. But in most metropoli-
tan areas, the large number of localities, the concentration of costs in the partic-
ular localities agreeing to forswear autonomy and contribute funds to other
localities or accept undesirable growth, and the diffuse nature of the benefits to
those localities that do cooperate are likely to interfere with the necessary re-
gionwide cooperation.
If, as I have suggested, sprawl and interlocal fiscal disparities are problems
for the region as a whole, then the public choice approach will not provide an
effective solution. The interlocal competition celebrated by public choice ag-
gravates, rather than mitigates, sprawl and fiscal disparities. Interlocal compe-
tition could, in theory, reduce disparities if each poorer community could cut its
168. See, e.g., David R. Boldt, Do We Want to Go the Way of Atlanta? Or Detroit?; PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 14, 1991, at C5 (espousing the view that the suburbs of Detroit "are doing all right
despite the city's demise").
169. See, e.g., George Julnes & Wolfgang Pindur, Determinants of Local Governmental Support
for Alternative Forms of Regional Coordination, 24 AM. REv. PUB. ADMtN. 411, 423-24 (1994) (con-
cluding that problems that impose even short-term costs on some localities "are likely to frustrate re-
gional efforts that lack (sufficient] authority").
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tax rate and service costs enough to attract new development, but the low tax
bases of poorer localities often compel them to raise rates even as the quality of
services declines. Furthermore, many of the costs poorer communities face are
determined by economic and social conditions beyond their control.170 Poorer
localities can do little to increase their local tax bases. 17' Yet, the structure of
interlocal competition can reduce the public investment necessary for future
regional growth, with negative consequences for the region as a whole.
By the same token, the voluntary interlocal cooperation that public choice
theorists advocate for addressing issues of regional scope is unlikely to mitigate
the consequences of local land use regulation and fiscal disparities. The struc-
ture of metropolitan areas-the large number of municipalities, the lack of di-
rect connections between particular municipalities, and the absence of a sense
of regional consciousness-will likely defeat regionwide cooperation that
would impose direct costs on currently privileged localities for the sake of indi-
rect long-term benefits.
B. Decentralization, Involuntary Cooperation, and Permeable Borders
Law Professors Jerry Frug and Richard Thompson Ford have recently put
forward several new proposals that address the question of metropolitan gov-
ernance. Unlike the public choice approach, Frug and Ford take seriously the
regional consequences of local land use regulation and interlocal fiscal dispari-
ties; but, like public choice, they oppose the creation of general purpose re-
gional governments. Although their specific proposals differ, they share two
central commitments: preserving and strengthening "[d]ecentralized centers of
power"'172 and simultaneously recognizing the pervasiveness of interlocal ef-
fects and cross-border activity. 173 In Professor Frug's words, they would "situ-
ate" the locality in its region,174 acknowledge "the mutually constitutive nature
of municipalities,"' 75 and "replace our current legal conception of localities
with one that embraces the ageographical city,"'1 7 6 that is, the metropolitan re-
gion. Yet, they would do so without the creation of "centralized regional
authority."'
177
Professors Frug and Ford want to reduce the significance of existing local
government boundaries-to make those borders more "permeable" in Professor
Ford's words'178-without creating new strong supralocal institutions. Local
170. See generally, LADD & YINGER, supra note 66 (discussing the effects on municipal fiscal
health of a variety of broad factors that may lie beyond cities' control).
171. Despite the often intense competition for new investment, the principal determinants of local
fiscal well-being are: regional economic conditions; location within the region, including proximity to
markets and other site-specific advantages; and preexisting wealth, which enables a locality to offer
high-quality services at a lower cost. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 46, at 125-74 (discussing local govern-
ment approaches to increasing local tax bases and limits to these approaches).
172. Ford, supra note 30, at 1908; Frug, supra note 31, at 271.
173. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909-10; Frug, supra note 31, at 294-300.
174. Frug, supra note 31, at 294.
175. Id. at 279.
176. Id. at 323.
177. Ford, supra note 30, at 1908; Frug, supra note 31, at 286, 336-37.
178. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909.
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governments would continue to wield power, but the duties and relationships of
local governments would no longer be defined by local boundaries. Instead,
voting in local elections would be opened to outsiders, localities would have
obligations to nonresidents, and the scope of local regulatory authority would
be determined through negotiation among local governments. The goal of per-
meable local boundaries is to maintain political power at the local level while
reducing the political autonomy of the group of people that resides within any
particular set of local borders.
1. The regional legislature.
Professor Frug's principal proposal is the creation of a regional legislature
to "organize local institutions, as well as legal doctrine, in terms of inter-local
relationships." 179 Professor Frug is critical of local autonomy that enables lo-
cal governments to use their land use powers and tax base for local purposes in
ways that are detrimental to the region as a whole. However, Professor Frug
also condemns efforts, like New Jersey's Mount Laurel doctrine,1 80 that would
force localities to consider the regional consequences of their actions. He be-
lieves that such policies represent a "central government's attempt" to impose
rules on localities: 181 Such a top-down effort to force self-interested localities
to "behave altruistically ...would strike the people who benefit from [the
status quo] as an astonishing invasion of their personal freedom"'182 and is
therefore likely to fail. More philosophically, such state decisions are inconsis-
tent with his vision of local self-government. 83 Given his own commitment to
local government as a "situated subject" whose identity ought to grow out of
interaction with other localities, Professor Frug would prefer that localities vol-
untarily realize their mutual interdependence. Regionally conscious zoning and
fiscal policies, for example, ought to be "worked out not centrally or by each
municipality alone but through regional negotiations."' 84 In other words, like
the public choice school, Professor Frug prefers voluntary interlocal agree-
ments to higher level decisionmaking.
Professor Frug's regional legislature would function primarily as a "forum
for inter-local negotiations" about the scope of local power.' 85 The regional
legislature emphatically would "not... act as a regional government or ape the
powers of the state."' 186 The legislature would not itself direct the provision of
services, make laws for the region, or regulate public or private bodies. Nor
would it oversee local governments or displace local decisions. Indeed, "the
legislature should be structured to encourage its members not to exercise power
179. Frug, supra note 31, at 294.
180. Id. at 286.
181. Id. at 285.
182. Id.
183. See Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URn. LAW. 553, 560-62, 568
(1987) (arguing that localities must resist "the temptation to seek a solution ... from a higher authority"
and must instead "agree among themselves").
184. Frug, supra note 31, at 286.
185. Id. at 297.
186. Id. at 295.
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themselves."18 7 Instead, its "one specific function" would be to define the lim-
its of local power, or as Frug states, to "allocat[e] ... entitlements to local
governments." Iss The legislature would exercise that function not by imposing
its own standards but by providing a setting to "forc[e] each locality to consider
the impact of their [sic] actions on the region as a whole" 189 so that "localities,
when making their decisions.... take the interests of other localities within the
region into account." 190
It is difficult to see how the regional legislature satisfies Professor Frug's
twin goals of regionally conscious local decisionmaking without a higher-level
government's "invasion" of local autonomy. There are two possible readings
of the regional legislature proposal. First, on the theory that the purpose of the
legislature is to permit more "situated" local decisionmaking without state in-
tervention, the legislature could be simply a forum for interlocal dialogue
where a new regional-mindedness might emerge. But a forum would be little
more than the formalization of the public choice school's reliance on voluntary
interlocal agreements that, thus far, have played little role in altering land use
or fiscal autonomy. Localities might have more regular opportunities to discuss
regional matters if there were a regional legislature, and that is, no doubt, desir-
able. But how would that alter the substance of local decisions? More affluent
localities would have no more incentive to modify their zoning to accept a
share of regional low- and moderate-income housing or to devote a larger por-
tion of their tax base to the support of schools in other localities. They might
have little to gain from any interlocal negotiation and might avoid interlocal
discussions altogether. If they participated in regional discussions of land use
regulation or the financing of public services, their current legal powers would
enable them to bargain from a position of strength and to refuse to make con-
cessions to their less fortunate neighbors.
The formal establishment of the legislature might make it easier to recog-
nize the existence of regionwide problems and to bring together the large
number of metropolitan area localities whose agreement would be needed to
tackle problems of regionwide scope. But so long as any agreements would be
voluntary, it is difficult to see why localities that do well under the existing
system would relinquish the power that the rules of local government law cur-
rently give them. This type of regional legislature would likely be no more
successful in curbing locally self-interested land use regulation or local fiscal
autonomy than the existing councils of government. COGs, which also rely on
voluntary member cooperation, have had minimal success at making local gov-
ernments more regionally conscious. 191
187. Id. at 297.
188. Id. at 296.
189. Id. at 295.
190. Id. at 296.
191. Professor Frug himself draws the analogy between his regional legislature and the role of the




Second, and more plausibly, by authorizing the regional legislature to "allo-
cate entitlements," Professor Frug means to change the dynamics of interlocal
bargaining. More affluent localities would no longer be able to rely on their
control of their tax base or their power to control local land use within their
borders to withhold resources from or concessions to other localities in interlo-
cal negotiations, or to abstain outright from such bargaining. Rather, local gov-
ernment's powers with respect to tax base and zoning would presumably come
out of the negotiations. But what happens to the powers over land use, tax
base, and services that these localities currently enjoy and which enable some
of them to resist cooperation? How do these metropolitan area localities lose
their existing entitlements and wind up in a metropolitan "original position" in
which they have no legal powers other than those that emerge from negotia-
tions with other local governments? This would occur only if existing entitle-
ments are stripped away from those who currently have them. And there is
only one way that can occur: action by the state to remove from localities the
powers currently vested in them.
Thus, although the purpose of the regional legislature is to avoid higher-
level directives, the principal moving part that would enable the legislature to
work is action by the state to divest localities of their existing powers. That is
at least as much a top-down "invasion" of local autonomy as the Mount Laurel
doctrine or any other state requirement that localities take regional concerns
into account when they exercise their existing powers. The proposal that the
state eliminate outright existing local entitlements is likely to encounter at least
as much resistance as more limited proposals either to reduce the scope of those
powers or to force localities to consider regional concerns in local policymak-
ing. And, as a theoretical matter, despite Professor Frug's commitment to de-
centralized decisionmaking, his proposal relies entirely on an initial
recentralization of power at the state level that is necessary to get interlocal
dialogue started and to force localities to come to terms with each other.
Professor Frug suggests that the regional legislature "would be a democratic
version of the idea of regional planning embodied in federal legislation of the
1960s and 1970s."192 The comparison with federally promoted regional plan-
ning reveals the extent to which the proposal relies on higher-level power for
its effectiveness. As previously noted, the metropolitan planning organizations
of the 1960s and 1970s were largely an outgrowth of federal provisions for
regional review-and-comment on applications for a range of federal grants.
The regional planning role of these organizations rested on federal require-
ments for regional coordination in the allocation of federal funds, and of
course, on the existence of upper-level funding programs. Eliminating the co-
ordination requirement and cutting federal funds caused an immediate decline
in the influence of those organizations-suggesting the extent to which re-
gional cooperation was dependent on pressure from above.193
192. Id. at 295.
193. Two more recent federal laws, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) and the Intermoda. Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in
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The regional legislature proposal, thus, relies covertly on a major, and un-
likely, exercise of power by the state. 194 Since I believe that the metropolitan
governance problem requires some exercise of upper-level power, the implicit
shift of power to the state is hardly a fatal objection for me-although it is
inconsistent with Professor Frug's goal of having the scope of local powers
emerge from interlocal dialogue unmediated by state interference. The real
question is whether Frug's conception of a limited regional legislature offers a
better means of state intervention than a more powerful regional institution. In
other words, following Frug's distinction, is a regional legislature really prefer-
able to a regional government?
195
Even if the principal purpose of a regional governance structure were lim-
ited to inducing local governments to consider regional interests-that is, to
use Professor Ford's term, to make local borders more permeable-some form
of regional government and not just a regional legislature as proposed by Pro-
fessor Frug would likely be necessary. In Professor Frug's vision, the purpose
of the regional legislature is to permit localities to reach interlocal agreements
concerning the scope of local powers-not to make rules or wield direct power.
But interlocal agreement requires more than just a forum for dialogue. It re-
quires some mechanism to monitor local actions after the agreement, to ensure
compliance, to resolve disputes concerning the meaning of the agreement, and,
ultimately, to intervene when local governments disregard the terms of the
agreement.
Governance arrangements that rely on cooperation are vulnerable to cheat-
ing. Unless localities establish effective mechanisms to detect and deter cheat-
ing, the temptation to cheat will be great, and cooperation in theory may be
nullified in practice. A legislative forum, alone, cannot oversee local decision-
making, resolve particular disputes, or enforce compliance with interlocal pol-
icy agreements. The large number of localities in the major metropolitan areas
makes it difficult for local governments to monitor each other effectively. And
to the extent that a local government's "cheating" would benefit its residents,
people within localities would lack the incentive to monitor their local govern-
ment's actions. Interlocal competition is, thus, likely to require some form of
regional monitoring.
Similarly, there would probably be a need for procedures to resolve con-
flicts over the meaning of entitlements and the scope of local authority in indi-
vidual cases. Without such a mechanism, the legislature's general principles of
interlocal cooperation may have little practical application. The legislature
might require support by some form of regional administrative body. Of
course, the legislature could itself address site-specific zoning disputes, the de-
scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 23, 26, 33, 40, 42, 45, 49 U.S.C.) represent a modest revival of the
general practice of using metropolitan planning organizations to allocate federal funds for local projects.
194. As Professor Frug observes in noting the difficulty of requiring local governments to imple-
ment a Mount Laurel doctrine imposed from above: "[l]t is unlikely that those who profit from current
law will undo it themselves." Frug, supra note 31, at 285. Given the influence of suburban localities in
state legislatures, it is indeed "unlikely that those who profit from current law will" eliminate local
powers.
195. See id. at 294-98 (contrasting a "regional legislature" with a "regional government").
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tails of the allocation of funds from local taxes to extralocal purposes, or tech-
nical aspects of local services, but the more the legislature applies its own rules
to concrete disputes, the more it is involved in determining regional policymak-
ing. As a result, the legislature would begin to evolve from a forum into a
regional government.
Ultimately, in cases where a locality fails to abide by the interlocal agree-
ment, the legislature will need some power to secure compliance, or the entire
process will have little point. The legislature must have the authority to dis-
place inconsistent local government rules, or to litigate regional-local disputes
in the state courts under laws that permit regional preemption of some local
power. But, again, the power to supersede inconsistent local laws, or to obtain
state judicial support for regional legislative decisions, is the hallmark of a
government, not a mere forum for interlocal discussion.
The regional legislature proposal relies on the ideal of regional decisions
emerging from interlocal interaction-the legislature's role is to remind locali-
ties just how "situated" they are among their neighbors. Professor Frug then
assumes that localities will take that "situatedness" into account in negotiating
the scope of their local powers with neighboring localities. But there is little
reason to believe that localities are not already aware of the other localities at
their borders. Patterns of local government formation and the deployment of
local land use powers demonstrate that people at the local level are quite aware
of the existence of other localities-they just want to use local government
powers to avoid the implications of "situatedness." Even if the proposed legis-
lature crafts cooperative agreements, their success will depend on the existence
of procedures for monitoring, dispute resolution, and enforcement. In order to
oversee and effectuate interlocal agreements, the regional legislature will have
to become the regional government that Professor Frug is striving to avoid-or
have little more effect in dealing with metropolitan problems than a COG.
2. Cross-border voting.
Both Professor Ford and Professor Frug propose changes in the rules of
local voting to allow nonresidents to vote in local elections. Professor Ford
would make local elections "open to all members of a metropolitan region or
even to all citizens of a state." 196 All local elections in the region would be
held on the same day; voters would receive a number of votes equal to the
number of local offices to be filled and could cast them wherever they chose.
Under such a system of regionwide cumulative voting for local office, "voters
would effectively draw their own jurisdictional boundaries, decide which local
governments were most important to them, and allocate their votes accord-
ingly."' 97 By providing for broader "democratic inclusion,"198 this electoral
reform would ameliorate the "evils of parochialism and insularity."' 9 9 Indeed,
196. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1910.
199. Id. at 1909.
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in Ford's view, a regional franchise, along with some form of regional revenue
sharing,200 would eliminate the need for upper-level review of exclusionary
local regulation or for a more centralized regional government. With political
rights decoupled from residency, the need to deny localities the power to en-
gage in locally self-interested or exclusionary regulation disappears.
Professor Frug, similarly, calls for regionwide 20 1 cumulative voting. In his
plan, "everyone gets five votes that they can cast in whatever local elections
they feel affect their interest ('local' still being defined by the traditional terri-
torial boundaries of city, suburb, or neighborhood). '202 Like Ford, Frug be-
lieves that no objective link to a particular locality should be required to vote in
that locality's elections: People "can define their interests differently in differ-
ent elections, and any form of connection that they think expresses an aspect of
themselves at the moment will be treated as adequate. '20 3 Regionwide voting
also implicates the regional legislature, as each local official in the legislature
"would have a constituency made up not only of residents but of workers, shop-
pers, property owners in neighboring jurisdictions, the homeless, and so
forth." 204
Although his proposal is similar to Professor Ford's, Professor Frug's em-
phasis is distinct. Professor Ford sees cross-border voting as a means of ren-
dering local borders more permeable and local polities more democratically
inclusive. Professor Frug sees in cross-border voting a means of recognizing
and reinforcing the "postmodem subjectivity" 20 5 of the metropolitan area and,
in particular, of demolishing the primacy of residency in determining the rela-
tionship between people and their local governments. In the contemporary me-
tropolis, people have interests, activities, and concerns in multiple jurisdictions.
Conversely, each locality has a constituency of people that works, shops, or
uses public facilities within the locality but lives beyond its borders. In such an
"ageographical city," 20 6 boundaries should have no role in defining the scope
of political participation. As Frug notes, "[m]ost importantly, such an electoral
scheme would radically change the idea of what a neighborhood or suburb or
city is-of who is included in a reference to such a locality. The 'self' in the
200. Although Professor Ford links the ideas of cross-border voting and regionalization of tax
base, they are actually quite distinct. Cross-border voting is central to his and Professor Frug's visions
of permeable local borders and of more regionally conscious local-level decisionmaking without a re-
gional governance structure. As Professor Ford seems to recognize, however, regionalization of tax
base requires a more active role for a regional or state government. Id. at 1910; see text accompanying
notes 218-233 infra.
201. Indeed, Professor Frug would not limit the extension of local voting to the metropolitan
region, but might permit people from around the country to vote in local elections. See Frug, supra note
31, at 329-30 & n.328.
202. d2 at 329; see also id. at 330 (arguing that "the voting system might also mimic the idea of
proportional representation by allowing someone to cast all five votes in one locality if that is where her/
his attachments are felt to be").
203. Id at 329.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 325.
206. Id. at 335.
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phrase local self-interest would become a gesture toward an unknown and un-
specifiable multiplicity.
'20 7
But cross-border voting is unlikely to provide a decentralized structure for
metropolitan governance. The residents of a locality would probably still cast
most of the votes in that locality's elections. If, however, the extended
franchise takes hold and leads to regional participation in local elections, cross-
border voting could, paradoxically, subvert the goal of preserving local level
decisionmaking. Indeed, cross-border voting could render local governments
incapable of serving the values traditionally vindicated by local autonomy, yet
no effective regional polity would be provided to replace them.
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that much cross-border voting would
actually take place. There are so many municipalities in a metropolitan area,
and the implications of the actions of any one municipality for the residents of
any other are, typically, indirect and cumulative, rather than proximate and im-
mediate. Thus most metropolitan area residents are unlikely to have much of
an interest in elections outside their home locality. 20 8
The most likely exception to this general rule would be the broad regional
interest in the politics of the central city. The central city is, typically, the
largest jurisdiction in the metropolitan area. In most areas, the central city re-
mains something of a focal point-for media attention, for employment, for
meetings of the regional economic and political leadership, and for recreational
and cultural activities. The central city will be the principal jurisdiction in
which the residents of many other localities have an interest, and central city
elections are likely to get the most media coverage. Thus cross-border voting
could become the basis for suburbanite voting in central city elections.
This would certainly be a paradoxical result for those who see in cross-
border voting an antidote to the "evils of parochialism and insularity" 20 9 and an
opportunity to open up the exclusionary white suburbs to the influence of the
central city. Although, in theory, central city voters could easily overwhelm
the residents of any particular suburb and thereby force a change in that sub-
urb's land use regulations, in practice, the large number of suburbs, the lack of
a direct nexus between a particular residential suburb and a group of central
city voters, the lack of major media coverage of suburban politics, and the
organizational difficulties inherent in concentrating a sizable block of central
city voters on the elections in a particular suburb, would probably frustrate the
ability of city residents to use cross-border voting to make suburban politics
more responsive to their interests and concerns. Instead, the central city would
more likely be the natural focal point of regional politics. Suburban voters
would have the incentive and-without great organizational effort-the ability
to target central city elections. Thus what is frequently the most racially and
economically heterogeneous jurisdiction in the metropolitan area would be
207. Id. at 330.
208. As Professor Frug observes, "[p]eople are unlikely to vote in a jurisdiction they do not care
about." Id. at 329.
209. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909.
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opened to voting by residents of the surrounding, relatively homogeneous sub-
urbs. Since the suburban population exceeds the city's in most metropolitan
areas, this could lead to a shift in political control of city governments from city
residents to suburbanites. Instead of opening up the suburbs, or providing an
opportunity for city residents to gain access to the suburbs' resources, cross-
border voting could cost city residents control over their own jurisdiction.
More generally, should cross-border voting actually occur, it would be po-
tentially subversive of the values of political participation, economic efficiency,
and community self-determination that constitute the heart of the case for local
autonomy.
First, cross-border voting would undermine the local conditions conducive
to political participation. Decentralization to the local level is said to promote
political participation because it vests power in political units that are relatively
small in population and territory. But with cross-border voting, localities
would cease to be small for electoral purposes. Rather, each locality would
have an electorate of metropolitan scope. Local politics would no longer be a
matter of deliberation, discussion, and debate at the neighborhood level.
Rather, cross-border voting would make the locality de facto coterminous with
the metropolitan area on election day. A regional electorate would be empow-
ered to elect local officials and determine local policies, even over the opposi-
tion of local political majorities.
The prospect of a loss of local control-of political frustration by outsid-
ers-could discourage political participation by local residents. More gener-
ally, by dramatically enlarging the electorate for local elections, cross-border
voting would concomitantly reduce the political influence of individual voters.
Each voter would be less effective at making policy or electing her preferred
candidates to office than in a polity with an electorate limited to those within
local borders. Thus the expansion of the electorate could wipe out the incentive
to, and the reward for, participation that comes from the enhanced sense of
individual effectiveness ordinarily associated with politics at the local level.
Indeed, cross-border voting would transform the nature of local elections.
Although the popular image of grassroots politics-of challengers campaigning
among their neighbors, volunteers leafletting on street comers and ringing
doorbells, and community organizations sponsoring candidates' nights in the
high school gymnasium-may be more than a little romanticized, it is true that
elections in smaller units can place a greater premium on face-to-face contact
and personal interaction and require less in the way of money and professional
staff. By enlarging the local electorate to include the entire region, cross-bor-
der voting could result in the displacement of neighborhood-based, volunteer-
organized "retail" campaigns by television advertising, direct mail, focus
groups, and the other costly, high-technology, "wholesale" techniques needed
to reach the large number of voters that make up an metropolitan-area-wide
electorate. The town meeting would be replaced by the regional media buy as
the central metaphor of local elections, and the values of small-scale politics
would be jeopardized, if not lost.
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Second, cross-border voting could potentially limit the efficiency benefits
of decentralization to the local level. It might be more difficult to tailor local
decisions to the particular preferences of local residents if a regionwide electo-
rate were able to select local officers or vote on local policies. A politically
mobilized regional electorate would be able to displace distinct local prefer-
ences. The efficiency benefits of local autonomy require both a multiplicity of
local governments and the political control of individual local governments by
local residents. Multiplicity alone would be of little policymaking significance
unless each locality were free to adopt its own policies. By potentially giving
every locality in a metropolitan area the same electorate, cross-border voting
could deny localities autonomy from each other.
I suspect that in practice cross-border voting would not eliminate interlocal
variations in taxes, regulation, and services. For the reasons I develop further
below, it is unlikely that even a politically mobilized regional electorate would
be able to impose the same local policies on each locality. But a regional elec-
torate could limit the range of interlocal variation, enabling interested outsiders
to intervene in order to nullify unusual local policies that have been the focus of
regional media coverage-whether or not they have significant extralocal im-
pacts. The point is not that cross-border voting would result in regional uni-
formity, but, rather, that by providing the means for reducing intraregional
variation, it could reduce the ability of local governments to respond to distinc-
tive local preferences or to test out novel approaches to local policy problems.
Finally, cross-border voting would negate community self-determination at
the local level. Residents of individual localities could have their votes in local
elections diluted, if not overwhelmed, by the votes of outsiders. Decisions
would still be made at the local level, but the group making the decision would
be the metropolitan electorate. As a result, local people could lose control over
local matters. People who live near each other, interact with each other on a
daily basis, and share interests and concerns with respect to their immediate
physical environment would no longer be able to decide neighborhood issues
on their own.
Enabling outsiders to make decisions for local residents, could transform
local governments from autonomous polities into administrative arms of the
metropolitan electorate. With the loss of political power, local communities
could become less salient to their residents and less significant as focal points
of obligation, sentiment, or identity. Rather, they could become submerged in
the broader metropolitan area. Again, it is unlikely that the regional electorate
would consistently displace local preferences. Regional interventions would
more likely be episodic rather than systematic, triggered by unusual candidates
or atypical policy proposals. Yet, even intermittent regional interference could
have an impact on the ability of locally concentrated regional minorities to
govern themselves, and the impact on the sense of local self-determination
could be severe. Indeed, it is the controversial local measures or candidates
that are both emblematic of local distinctiveness and most likely to attract re-
gional media coverage that would draw the greatest cross-border turnout. One
can easily imagine a regional electorate-or regional groups organized on an
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ideological or special interest basis-drawn to a local election focused on a
"hot button" issue, like gay rights, gun control, a distinctive school curriculum,
or a left- or right-wing candidate, and, in so doing, displacing local preferences
that differ from the regional majority or the organized outsiders. Local self-
determination could suffer as much from arbitrary, intermittent, and unpredict-
able outside interference as from the regular supplanting of local preferences.
Either would be a reminder that local people lack the power to make their own
policies or elect their own candidates and that any local autonomy would exist
only at the sufferance of the regional majority.
Cross-border voting, thus, could undermine political self-determination at
the local community level. Yet cross-border voting unaccompanied by the cre-
ation of some sort of regional government is unlikely to provide an effective
means of addressing metropolitan problems or a basis for self-government for
the metropolitan area.
Cross-border voting-as opposed to regional elections to a regional gov-
eming body-is inadequate to the job of metropolitan policymaking. To im-
plement metropolitan land development policies that would reduce the costs of
sprawl and increase the availability of affordable housing, the metropolitan
electorate would have to organize itself and concentrate its votes on one local-
ity after another in successive elections over a period of decades. Policies that
require simultaneous, coordinated action across a number of localities might
not be feasible, since, given the difficulties of organizing voters to vote outside
their home communities, it might not be logistically possible to target the requi-
site number of communities in the same election. Land development practices
that require local policies to be consistent over time would not be viable either,
since the metropolitan electorate would find it difficult to exercise sustained
control over land use decisions in particular localities. After intervening and
setting aside an exclusionary rule in one locality in one election and then mov-
ing on to another locality in another election, there would be no ongoing over-
arching state or metropolitan law that would prevent the first locality from
backsliding and reverting to exclusionary practices when the metropolitan elec-
torate is no longer "looking" at it. In short, relying on cross-border voting to
reform metropolitan land use practices assumes a degree of political organiza-
tion and endurance that is more heroic than realistic.
For similar reasons, it is unlikely that cross-border voting would be able to
effectuate the redistribution of wealth from affluent to poorer localities. Again,
residents of poorer communities would have to organize themselves to target
identified affluent jurisdictions, and they would have to do so in election after
election. Indeed, regional redistribution might be even more difficult to
achieve than regional land use regulation since some issues of land use regula-
tion would be removed from debate once particular developments have taken
place. But political organization would be necessary in every election to force
redistribution to support the operating expenses of poorer localities.
Nor is it clear that in eroding the significance of local community, cross-
border voting would create a sense of metropolitan community. To be sure, by
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enabling local residents to vote in elections in other localities in the metropoli-
tan area, cross-border voting could remind them of the connections that link
these communities together and could give them more of a stake in the well-
being of the region as a whole. Moreover, cross-border voting would probably
entail the formal bounding of the metropolitan area in order to determine the
territorial scope of the new regional electorate.210 Thus the metropolitan area
would take on political shape and jurisdictional consequences, further increas-
ing the possibility that cross-border voting could give rise to a regional con-
sciousness. But cross-border voting, as put forward by Professors Ford and
Frug, is not the same as regional voting. In particular, it does not entail the
election of officials with regional responsibilities. It is unlikely that cross-bor-
der voting unaccompanied by regional institutions would become the basis for
the construction of a metropolitan political community.
Cross-border voting does not involve the creation of regional institutions or
the election of representatives to a regional governing body. Indeed, it has
been presented by its proponents as a means of transcending local parochialism
without shifting power to regional institutions. Although cross-border voting
would provide a vehicle for residents of one locality to indicate their prefer-
ences with respect to candidates and policies in another locality, it offers no
mechanism to shape issues that cut across local boundaries and directly affect
the region as a whole. By failing to create regional political structures or to
provide opportunities for the election of regional officials, it minimizes the
sense of the metropolitan area as a politico-territorial community. Cross-border
voting would encourage local residents to think less in terms of the interests of
the region as a whole and more in terms of their private interests in other partic-
ular communities. Cross-border voting is a strategy for targeted interventions
across the metropolitan area rather than a framework for encouraging metropol-
itan area residents to think in metropolitan terms. Moreover, by subjecting all
localities to ad hoc and potentially random displacement by metropolitan ma-
jorities, but not reserving any local policy areas for purely local decisionmak-
ing, cross-border voting could actually increase local resentment against
outsiders in the metropolitan area and be a source of regional conflict rather
than regional consciousness.
In short, cross-border voting-if it actually took place-might actually pro-
duce the worst of both worlds: the loss of the local autonomy that is the justifi-
cation for decentralization, without the creation of the regional institutions or
the regional consciousness that would facilitate the adoption and implementa-
tion of policies serving the interests of the metropolitan area as whole. Cross-
border voting would have the anomalous effect of creating a metropolitan area-
wide electorate that could displace the decisions of local electorates without
providing the metropolitan governance structure necessary to create regional
self-government.
210. But see Frug, supra note 31, at 329-30 & n.328 (suggesting that cross-border voting could be
extended beyond the region).
1162 [Vol. 48:1115
May 1996] LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY PROBLEM
3. The limits of decentralization solutions to metropolitan problems.
Decentralization has long been a core value in thinking about local govern-
ment but, as I hope this critique of the Ford and Frug proposals suggests, con-
tinued decentralization cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the central
problems of contemporary metropolitan governance. Traditional decentraliza-
tion-the delegation of broad regulatory, service-provision, and revenue-rais-
ing powers to local governments acting within local borders, including the
power to hold on to locally raised revenues for internal purposes-is a major
source of the land use development problems and fiscal disparities that plague
many metropolitan areas. Professors Ford and Frug recognize this relationship
but would still attempt to save decentralization by transforming the nature of
local boundaries and interlocal relations. In their view, "permeable" borders
and regional dialogue concerning the nature of local authority would open local
governments to regional concerns without shifting power out of local hands.
Their proposals would continue to allow "people to form their own communi-
ties[;] . . . it's just that they cannot do so without confronting people in other
communities."'21' This would reduce local detachment and promote local re-
sponsiveness to metropolitan interests beyond local borders.212 Decentraliza-
tion would be preserved and, purged of local parochialism and insularity,
would provide the basis for locally initiated approaches to regional problems.
But in their efforts to combine local autonomy with regionally sensitive
local governance, Professors Ford and Frug would unintentionally undermine
the values that local autonomy is intended to serve without actually providing
the basis for effective regional governance. To be sure, they are correct in
asserting that the significance of local borders needs to be reduced. Local regu-
latory policies with regional consequences must be subject to regional or state
oversight, and regionwide resources ought to be available to meet regional
needs.2 13 But instead of limiting their focus to local decisions that have re-
gional consequences, they would open all local decisionmaking to outside par-
ticipation. This would undermine the political and economic values of local
autonomy and would, indeed, allow a regional electorate to deny local self-
determination to metropolitan area localities. By losing the power to reach lo-
cal decisions free of outside intervention, local communities would cease to be
local governments. So, too, forced regional negotiations over the scope of local
power would cloak a shift in power from localities to the state.
Yet, neither initiative would provide the basis for building a sense of metro-
politan consciousness or empowering a metropolitan community to address
problems of regional significance. Professor Frug's regional legislature would
not be authorized to carry out its decisions. Professor Ford's regional electo-
rate could displace local electorates but would lack the regional political struc-
tures necessary to debate, formulate, and carry out regional policies.
211. Id. at 337.
212. Ford, supra note 30, at 1909; Frog, supra note 31, at 329-30.
213. Poindexter, supra note 160, at 24-44 (proposing a model for the equitable regional redistri-
bution of poverty-related expenses).
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Decentralized but regionally sensitive metropolitan governance is an attrac-
tive illusion. Regional structures and institutions are necessary to solve the
critical questions of metropolitan area governance.
IV. CONCLUSION: BOUNDING THE METROPOLIS
Metropolitan governance must be reconceived. The traditional model of
decentralization of authority to local governments with broad regulatory, reve-
nue-raising, and service-provision powers within their boundaries but minimal
responsibilities to people and localities outside those boundaries is in tension
with the basic economic and social structure of contemporary metropolitan ar-
eas. Contemporary metropolitan area localities are not freestanding, relatively
isolated communities capable of governing themselves without imposing bur-
dens on other localities in the region. Instead, they are often components of
economically and socially intertwined regions. Area residents have regular in-
teractions with multiple localities, and a locality's decisions frequently have
consequences for other localities and for the region as a whole. As a result,
neither the political, the economic, nor the communitarian arguments for local
autonomy fully obtain in the metropolitan area. Local autonomy in the metro-
politan area limits popular political participation concerning issues of metropol-
itan significance, fosters interlocal competition rather than the interlocal
collaboration that would promote regional well-being, and blocks recognition
of the metropolitan area as a politically and economically relevant community.
Moreover, in many areas, decentralized governance through existing local gov-
emments has generated local policies that promote sprawl, class and racial sep-
aration, and enormous disparities in the quality of local services.
Voluntary interlocal cooperation is not an adequate solution. Many of the
costs decentralization imposes on metropolitan areas result from the structure
of interlocal competition and the aggregate of local decisions, rather than from
the consequences of one specific locality's action towards another. Under these
circumstances, the incentive for the more favorably situated locality to cooper-
ate would be small. For such a locality, the costs from losing local control,
permitting locally undesirable land uses, or paying subsidies to poorer localities
would be large and immediate, whereas the benefit from the healthier develop-
ment of the metropolitan area might be small, attenuated, and in the future.
The large number of localities in most metropolitan areas, and the concomitant
likelihood of holdouts and free riders, would compound the difficulty of pro-
moting regional approaches to land development or fiscal equalization through
voluntary cooperation.
Nor is making local borders more permeable by itself a solution. The no-
tion of permeability is a useful reminder of the cross-border consequences of
local actions, and of the stake that those living outside the locality, but within
the metropolitan area, have in the locality's decisions. Localities ought to be
more open to the interests and concerns of the metropolitan area beyond their
borders. But permeability simultaneously goes too far and not far enough. Per-
meability, conceived as political participation by metropolitan area residents in
1164 [Vol. 48:1115
May 1996] LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY PROBLEM
all local elections, potentially opens up all local decisions to outside determina-
tion. But many local actions have relatively few extralocal consequences. By
potentially ousting local residents from control over matters legitimately within
the local domain, cross-border voting would undermine the basic values of lo-
cal autonomy. Permeable borders could diminish the ability of residents of
particular localities to govern themselves, yet permeability with continued de-
centralization to existing local governments would be insufficient to enable the
metropolitan area as a whole to govern itself. At the very least some additional
layer of government-either a metropolitan government or an empowered state
government-would be necessary to enforce local permeability. More impor-
tantly, permeability alone would fail to provide an institutional framework for
regional deliberations, the development of a regional perspective, or the imple-
mentation of solutions to regionwide problems.
Metropolitan governance will require not just a reduction in the significance
of existing local boundaries but the creation of new, regional boundaries. The
metropolitan area is frequently an economic unit. It needs to become a political
unit as well. Bounding the metropolis would bring greater "clarity" 2 14 to the
notion of the metropolitan area as a distinctive, internally interconnected place,
and would thus provide a political basis for enabling residents to conceive of
the metropolitan area as a community. More figuratively, bounding the me-
tropolis with regional political institutions could provide the regulatory and ad-
ministrative capacity to deal with regionwide problems that cannot be
addressed by the existing local government structure. It would offer a critical
opportunity for regionwide deliberation, popular participation in decisions of
regional significance, and the accountability of regional officials to the people
who live in the region.
Yet, as the long history of resistance to regional government demon-
strates,2 15 in most areas the creation of a metropolitan governance structures
will not be easy. Indeed, by reminding us of just how strongly attached many
people are to local control and to the merits of small political units, the opposi-
tion to regionalism provides a salutary lesson. The strong preference for local
government needs to be taken into account in crafting regional structures. As a
practical matter, metropolitan governance plans will have to be designed to
minimize voter opposition. Moreover, as John Kincaid notes, "voters have spo-
ken rather clearly and consistently on matters of metropolitan regionalism in
the twentieth century, and the requisites of democracy require some deference
to their preferences.
'2 16
Thus the rule of subsidiarity 2 17 ought to obtain. Rather than consolidate all
local government powers and responsibilities at the regional level, only those
214. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
215. See text accompanying notes 10-21 supra.
216. Kincaid, supra note 17, at 476.
217. My colleague George Bermann defines subsidiarity as the "notion that action should be taken
at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be achieved." George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 338 (1994).
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functions necessary for metropolitan governance should be shifted to regional
institutions. The remaining local government activities-including much local
land use regulation, local taxation, and the direct provision of most traditional
local services-should remain at the local level. A metropolitan area govern-
ment must also be democratic. Local residents who fear loss of control to a
regional structure must be assured of a voice in its decisionmaking. The metro-
politan structure must provide an opportunity for regional deliberations from
the bottom up, rather than simply serve as a vehicle for the imposition of tech-
nocratic solutions from the top down.
The optimal metropolitan area government needs three crucial powers: to
determine land use questions of regional significance; to collect and distribute
revenues in order to promote greater equalization of local fiscal capacity and
local service quality; and to provide regionwide physical infrastructure. The
land use power must include both the authority to adopt regional land use plans
that will bind future land development throughout the region and the power to
displace local land use actions that have regional significance. Such regionally
significant uses include local barriers to regionally necessary, but locally unde-
sirable land uses, and local land use authorizations that impose negative exter-
nalities on the rest of the region.
The metropolitan government's fiscal powers must include the power to
raise revenues, whether by redistributing tax revenues from one jurisdiction to
another or by levying its own taxes,2 18 and the power to distribute the funds to
local governments unable to provide an appropriate level of public services out
of their local tax bases. Its direct service delivery powers would presumably
include those powers currently exercised by regional entities-mass transit, air-
ports, water supply, waste water treatment, etc.
Even though the regional government would have a limited number of
functions, it must be elected. Regional elections could help area residents to
see the region as an area with shared interests and concerns. Moreover, only an
elected regional government would enjoy the legitimacy that would enable it to
displace the decisions of component local governments. And only an elected
regional government would be able to assure voters they have a voice in poli-
cymaking and that regional decisionmaking institutions would ultimately be
accountable to area residents.
218. A current, albeit quite limited, instance of metropolitan taxation for metropolitan area pur-
poses is the use of special regional levies to fund mass transit systems. These revenues, however, are
limited to a specific service provided by the metropolitan entity and are not used to equalize fiscal
disparities among local governments. See Poindexter, supra note 160, at 28-29 & n.136.
As part of its school finance reform, the Texas legislature provided for the creation of county
education districts ("CEDs") authorized to levy and collect ad valorem property taxes and to distribute
the revenue to local school districts. The Texas Supreme Court, however, invalidated the measure for
violating a provision of the Texas Constitution barring the imposition of state ad valorem property taxes.
Because both the tax rate and the distribution of the proceeds were determined by the state legislature,
the Supreme Court determined that the CEDs were "purely ministerial," and, thus, that the tax, although
nominally imposed by the CEDs, was actually a proscribed state tax. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 500-03 (1992). Had the CEDs been given
greater autonomy, their regional property tax, intended to equalize the fiscal disparities of local school
districts, might have been sustained. Id. at 503.
1166 [Vol. 48:1115
May 1996] LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY PROBLEM
Metropolitan representatives might be elected through existing local units
or through newly created regional districts. Alternative voting rules like lim-
ited voting, cumulative voting, and preferential voting might be used to facili-
tate the representation of nonterritorially concentrated groups. Elected officials
might be given roles in the regional governance structure, either serving ex
officio on the regional governing body, or on councils empowered to consider
and advise on proposed regional legislation. But if regional government is to
provide a basis for democratically accountable regional decisionmaking, it must
have its own elected officials.
An elected metropolitan government focussed tightly on regional concerns
might mitigate the intensity of popular opposition. The relative paucity of in-
stances of regional controls over land use and regional fiscal equalization, how-
ever, suggests that resistance to the transfer of core aspects of local autonomy
to a regional entity is likely to remain quite powerful.219 Even if the combina-
tion of election and limited powers failed to make metropolitan government
more palatable, some form of limited regionalism that preserves local control
over a range of fairly broad local matters and leaves most service delivery
decisions in local hands would still be preferable to a full consolidation to a
metropolitan government so large that it lacks any of the participatory, effi-
ciency, and communitarian benefits of a local government.
Beyond the political resistance to loss of local control over land use and tax
base, the creation of a regional government would likely encounter other practi-
cal problems. As with all questions of boundary drawing, the determination of
the territorial scope of a metropolitan area will often be uncertain, and the
placement of the regional government's borders may be a source of conflict.220
Moreover, if sprawling land development patterns were to continue unchecked,
then, unless the metropolitan entity's boundaries included some space for fu-
ture growth, the metropolitan area might soon expand beyond the bounds of
even a regional government.221 In addition, some metropolitan areas, including
many of the largest ones, cross state lines. 222 For these areas, a true regional
government would require interstate compacts, as well as state legislative ac-
tion and local voter approval. The cumulative legal and political hurdles to a
government spanning the entire metropolitan region might prove insuperable.
219. As one commentator notes, "planning authority with the force of law has been rarely ap-
proved." William R. Dodge, Regional Problem Solving in the 1990s: Experimentation with Local Gov-
ernance for the 21st Century, 79 NAT'L Civic REV. 354, 361 (1990).
220. See, e.g., Jones & Rothblatt, supra note 4, at 378 (discussing the uncertain definition of the
territorial scope of the San Francisco Bay Area).
221. See, e.g., Frances Frisken, Planning and Servicing the Greater Toronto Area: The Interplay
of Provincial and Municipal Interests, in MMOPOTAN GOVEMANCE, supra note 4, at 153, 153-54,
157 (noting that the Greater Toronto Area now overspills the boundaries of the Metropolitan Toronto
government); Marie-Odile Tr6panier, Metropolitan Government in the Montreal Area, in ME-rRopoLI-
TAN GOvERNAxcE, supra note 4, at 53, 104 (most of the growth in the Montreal metropolitan area has
been outside the jurisdiction of the Montreal Urban Community-the area's regional government).
222. In 1990, 10 of the 30 most populous metropolitan areas-and five of the top 10 metropolitan
areas-crossed state lines. Henry G. Cisneros, Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation, in DESTI.
rnas, supra note 2, at 17, 23, tbl. 2.
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More limited metropolitan structures, focused on governing the portion of the
metropolitan area within a particular state, may be necessary.
Indeed, given the political difficulties of creating a metropolitan govern-
ment, an alternative solution is greater state assumption of responsibility for the
well-being of metropolitan areas. The creation of a metropolitan political struc-
ture would almost certainly require both state legislation and local voter ap-
proval, as well as the resolution of many complex questions concerning the
political and administrative powers and territorial scope of the new metropoli-
tan entity. A direct state role in metropolitan issues would obviate both the
difficulties of determining those boundary questions and the obstacle of voter
approval. Thus, from the practical perspective of addressing metropolitan
problems, a case could be made for direct state governance of the metropolitan
area. Moreover, given the significance metropolitan areas play in the economy
of their states, the states have a considerable stake in the well-being of these
regions.
Nevertheless, a metropolitan-level local government remains preferable.
Some states have more than one metropolitan area, and most states with metro-
politan areas also have significant nonmetropolitan components. Often there
will be competition for public resources and private development between these
different metropolitan areas and between the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
areas. Moreover, in some states there may be little interaction between the
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. Direct state governance could, thus,
shift control to those uninterested in, if not hostile to, the metropolitan area. It
might be difficult for a metropolitan area to take action on a matter of metro-
politan significance if it had to depend on the interest and support of outsiders.
Direct state governance would not provide metropolitan area residents the op-
portunity to voice their concerns on metropolitan questions that elections to a
metropolitan government would. And direct state rule would do little to pro-
mote the notion of a metropolitan community among area residents.
Metropolitan governance would not by itself be a panacea for metropolitan
area problems. Much would depend on the policies pursued by the metropoli-
tan government. A critical evaluation of Toronto's metropolitan government
noted that it had "done little to reduce the influence of local governments on the
area's physical development." 223 Without metropolitan land use policies that
promote balanced development and fiscal policies that enable poorer localities
to provide adequate local public services without straining local tax bases, met-
ropolitan government could fail to ameliorate the sprawling growth and the
separation of resources from needs that are the defining features of many met-
ropolitan areas. Regional planning and fiscal, equalization are needed, but met-
ropolitan government may not provide them. After all, the voters who
currently resist restrictions on local land use and fiscal autonomy would have a
significant voice in the election of any metropolitan area government.
Yet, if metropolitan government is not by itself a solution to metropolitan
area problems, it is unlikely that the necessary policies would ever be adopted
223. Frisken, supra note 221, at 191.
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outside of some metropolitan government framework. The current local gov-
ernment structure promotes interlocal competition for land use and tax base and
makes it difficult to see, let alone act on, the regional interest. Regional land
use planning and regional redistribution are unlikely to occur without some
clear sense among area residents of the region as a distinct community with
shared interests and a common fate. These policies rely on a mix of regional
self-interest and regional equity concerns. As a matter of self-interest, regional
development and regional fiscal equalization may improve the overall eco-
nomic well-being of a metropolitan area, but that argument will have purchase
with metropolitan area residents only if they see the metropolitan area as a
distinct entity-as a "self" (to which they belong) that has an interest. Simi-
larly, equity arguments for redistribution tend to operate within borders; that is,
the notion of a duty to provide support for the needy and afflicted proceeds
largely from a sense of membership in a common community. "[lit is often
said that our positive obligations to our fellow citizens are much more substan-
tial than those we have toward 'strangers.' "224 Implicit in the very notion of
community is the idea of "people who care about or feel responsible for each
other's well-being." 22 The creation of a metropolitan political unit would pro-
vide a framework for the development of a sense of regional community,
226
which is a practical precondition for fiscal redistribution within the metropoli-
tan area.
The paradoxical relationship between metropolitan government and metro-
politan community is central to the future of metropolitan areas. Metropolitan
areas will require a sense of metropolitan community in order to curtail local
land use and fiscal autonomy and promote policies for the overall development
of the region. The sense of community will probably require a greater defini-
tion of the metropolitan area as a distinct territorial and political unit and some
form of popular metropolitan collective action through a metropolitan govern-
ment. Yet popular resistance to any metropolitan government that would dis-
place or curtail existing local governments is likely to be powerful-and
politically decisive-in the absence of an already existing sense of metropoli-
tan community.
This is the "chicken and egg" conundrum at the heart of the metropolitan
boundary problem: A metropolitan government is unlikely to be adopted with-
out some prior sense of metropolitan community, but a sense of metropolitan
community is unlikely to exist without some prior political definition of the
area, that is, some metropolitan government. Most likely, metropolitan com-
munity consciousness and metropolitan governance structures will have to de-
224. ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MoRALITy OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER.
To LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 115 (1991).
225. ELKrNs, supra note 51, at 168.
226. Of course, even a regional governance structure may not be sufficient to create a sense of
regional community. As Judith A. Martin noted in her evaluation of metropolitan government in the
Twin Cities, "Ithe fragility of the regional relationships that have evolved in the Twin Cities is evi-
dent.... Despite many years of de jure metropolitan cooperation, there is a de facto lack of consensus
on many issues that have metropolitan significance." Martin, supra note 20, at 240. On the other hand,
it should be noted that Twin Cities regional institutions are appointed not elected.
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velop in tandem, each reinforcing the other, each making the other more
possible. Yet, at present, in most metropolitan areas, there are few regional
political institutions-other than special districts and public authorities not in-
tended to provide for popular participation in regional decisions-and little
popular support for regionalism.
Some commentators have looked to the development of regional business,
citizens' and nonprofit organizations, and cross-sectoral alliances linking these
organizations and promoting public-private partnerships with area governments
to promote regionwide cooperation and a sense of regional consciousness. The
activities of these organizations may constitute a form of civic infrastructure
that can provide a foundation for the adoption of more formal regional govern-
ance structures.227 Other writers have urged that federal assistance to states
and metropolitan area localities be conditioned on greater interlocal coopera-
tion, including regionwide planning.228 The Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act ("ISTEA") of 1991229 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 23 0-which established new metropolitan planning requirements concern-
ing transportation and air pollution-have been heralded as new federal incen-
tives for metropolitan governance. 231 In this era of sharply declining federal
intergovernmental assistance, however, federal aid programs are likely to be an
uncertain lever for promoting metropolitan structures. Moreover, the federal
metropolitan planning requirements of the 1960s and 1970s had little effect
then, and even less long-term consequence, in promoting regional
government. 232
227. For a highly optimistic vision of the potential of business and nonprofit organizations, cross-
sectoral alliances, and public-private partnerships to resolve problems of regional governance, see Wal-
lis, supra note 165, at 292-93. Wallis argues that informal networks of private and public-private coop-
eration alone-without more formal governmental structures-can supply the governance that
metropolitan regions need. Id. at 309. However, without the quintessentially governmental powers of
land use regulation and taxation, Wallis' "third wave" of cooperative has done little to deal with the
central problems of regional sprawl and fiscal disparities. Moreover, the alliances that he favors provide
little opportunity for direct popular participation. Thus these alliances fail to satisfy regional governance
needs, but they can be important in promoting a sense of regional consciousness and in providing crucial
political support for more formal regional institutions. Cf PEIRCE, supra note 3, at 322-25 (discussing
the importance of a "strong citizen organization" to "undergird" governance in metropolitan regions).
228. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 14, at 175-79 (advocating the creation of a regional allocation
agency); RusK, supra note 9, at 102-16 (proposing tax incentives for reinvigorating central cities).
229. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16,
23, 26, 33, 40, 42, 45, 49 U.S.C.).
230. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
231. ISTEA requires the designation of a "metropolitan planning organization" in each urbanized
area with a population of more than 50,000 and requires that they be given significant authority to plan
and allocate the federal highway and transit funds appropriated pursuant to the Act. Pub. L. No. 102-
240, title !, § 1024(a), 105 Stat. at 1955 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 134(b)(1)). The Clean Air Act Amend-
menus' influence on metropolitan governance would be more indirect. By requiring state governments
to create plans for meeting air quality standards in metropolitan areas where pollution exceeds accepta-
ble levels, the Amendments could lead to the displacement of land use regulatory powers to the extent
that local land use decisions contribute to area air pollution. See DowNs, supra note 14, at 174-75
(discussing effects of "driving and commuting behavior" on air quality); Kincaid, supra note 17, at 475
(discussing Clean Air Act Amendments as examples of "regulatory regionalism").
232. See notes 164 & 191 supra and accompanying texts. For a critical evaluation of the much-
ballyhooed ISTEA, see Jonathan Walters, The Highway Revolution That Wasn't, GovERNINo, May
1995, at 30.
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Additional research into the apparent economic interdependence of locali-
ties within a metropolitan region might play an important role in helping make
the case that metropolitan policies are in the self-interest of residents of the
affluent localities that currently appear to benefit most from the current system
of local control-assuming, of course, that future research confirms the recent
studies that make the case for metropolitan interdependence.233 So, too, close
contextual analysis of those metropolitan areas-such as Seattle, Portland, and
the Twin Cities-that have gone furthest in the implementation of regional
policies and governance structures may illuminate the political factors most
conducive to regionalism. We need to know more about the political, eco-
nomic, social, geographic or other conditions that contribute to a sense of re-
gional distinctiveness and of regional community prior to the creation of formal
regional boundaries and institutions.
There is little reason to be optimistic about the prospects for metropolitan
governance. Hostility to metropolitan government is intertwined with a com-
mitment to local autonomy that is deeply rooted in both law and politics. Yet,
in most metropolitan areas true autonomy at the local level is illusory. Each
locality is affected by the decisions of the other localities in the region, much as
the interlocal competition to gain tax base and avoid service costs ineluctably
constrains each locality's freedom to make its own decisions concerning taxes,
services, and regulation. Even with minimal state intervention, the actions of
other localities and the structure of interlocal relations limit the autonomy of
any individual locality.
Decentralization, which is intended to promote the political empowerment
of individuals and communities, has produced the very structural constraints
that serve to limit the ability of metropolitan area localities to respond to the
needs of metropolitan area residents. Local boundaries are too narrow to per-
mit effective self-governance for metropolitan area residents. They need to be
supplemented by a regionally bounded metropolitan political structure endowed
with the regulatory and fiscal capacity to tackle regional problems and the ac-
countability that election by a metropolitan area electorate provides. Indeed,
this combination of local and metropolitan political structures can better pro-
mote the ultimate goals of decentralization than a decentralization focused on
autonomy within existing local boundaries. The future development of metro-
politan areas would benefit if decentralization proponents recognized that the
values of decentralization would actually be better served by a less decentral-
ized governance structure that enabled the people who live in metropolitan ar-
eas to find their common interests and collectively address their common
problems.
233. See notes 104-122 supra and accompanying text.
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